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  INTRODUCTION   
Like many prior presidents,1 Donald Trump came into office 
promising to roll back his predecessor’s regulations.2 But unlike 
earlier presidents, President Trump did not stick with just the 
usual strategy of using “stop-work” orders to attack very late-
 
 1. See, e.g., James Carney & John F. Dickerson, How Bush Plans to Roll 
Back Clinton, TIME (Jan. 21, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/ 
0,8599,96140,00.html [https://perma.cc/4F9Z-EGRN] (detailing plans to reverse 
guidance and make regulatory changes); Ceci Connolly & R. Jeffrey Smith, 
Obama Positioned to Quickly Reverse Bush Actions, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/08/ 
AR2008110801856.html?nav=E8 [https://perma.cc/2MJL-JVH2] (same). 
 2. Gregory Korte, Trump Promises to Reduce Federal Regulations to Pre-
1960 Level, USA TODAY (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
politics/2017/12/14/trump-promises-reduce-federal-regulations-pre-1960-level/ 
953072001/ [https://perma.cc/YUG4-2MR5]; see also Remarks by President 
Trump in Joint Address to Congress, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 28, 2017), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint 
-address-congress/ [https://perma.cc/8357/-8GKB] (claiming to have “under-
taken a historic effort to massively reduce job-crushing regulations”). 
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term regulations3 or going through notice-and-comment rule-
making to repeal regulations.4 Instead, he also made aggressive 
use of several relatively low-profile tools—disapprovals under 
the Congressional Review Act,5 abeyances in pending litigation,6 
and suspensions of final regulations7—to target more of the prior 
administration’s regulations than had been the case in previous 
transitions. These tools had been used before, but the Trump ad-
ministration used them far more aggressively than previous ad-
ministrations had, targeting many significant regulations from 
as far back as 2015 in areas such as the environment and finan-
cial regulation, among others.8  
In recent decades, as presidents have been less able to ob-
tain legislative wins due to congressional gridlock,9 they have 
aggressively used regulatory measures to make policy,10 a pro-
cess that has come to be known as “presidential administra-
tion.”11 But the new prominence of the rollback tools is likely to 
change those presidential strategies to a significant extent. The 
ability of future presidents to continue the aggressive use of 
 
 3. Traditionally, after an inter-party transition, a new president instructs 
agencies to stop work on any pending regulations and to withdraw any that 
were not officially published in time. See infra note 14.  
 4. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2012), gov-
erns such repeals. See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.  
 5. The Congressional Review Act allows Congress to disapprove of a regu-
lation within a certain amount of time after it is finalized. See infra notes 51–
68 and accompanying text.  
 6. An abeyance is a court order placing a pending challenge to a regulation 
on hold. See infra notes 107–12 and accompanying text.  
 7. Suspensions put a regulation on hold. See infra note 38 and accompa-
nying text. 
 8. See, e.g., Extension of Deadline for Promulgating Designations for the 
2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 82 Fed. Reg. 29,246 (June 
28, 2017) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 81) (suspending the 2015 ozone rule); 
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 82 Fed. Reg. 16,902 (Apr. 7, 2017) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) (suspending the 2016 rule regulating investment 
advice); Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point 
Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005 (Apr. 25, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 423) (suspending the 2015 rule setting wastewater limits).  
 9. See Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1489, 1518–25 (2018) (discussing Congressional gridlock in the tax system). 
 10. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and 
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 559–61 (2003) 
(describing presidents’ desires to make policy decisions through regulations). 
 11. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2264 (2001). 
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these rollback tools means that a far larger proportion of regula-
tions promulgated during a president’s last term will be at risk 
following an inter-party transition. As long as legislative victo-
ries remain difficult to obtain, we are likely to see presidents 
make important changes to adjust to the new threats in order to 
continue to preserve the output of their regulatory policy. The 
new pressures will affect how presidents transition into their 
jobs, weigh the decision of whether to wait until a second term 
to promulgate controversial regulations, and make the decision 
about whether to get involved in electoral campaigns for Con-
gress and for their successor. Administrative agencies are also 
likely to change the manner in which they conduct their rule-
making. The impact of these tools will lead to a new conception 
of the president’s regulatory power, in which two terms, rather 
than just one, are necessary to promulgate significant and last-
ing regulatory policy.  
Because this shift in regulatory policy has been undertaken 
with low-visibility strategies, its broader impact has gone largely 
overlooked, not just by the public, but also by legal scholars. Ac-
ademic work to date has generally taken the traditional regula-
tory rollback tools as a given, implicitly seeing the world as one 
in which presidents must use stop-work orders or notice-and-
comment rulemaking to repeal regulations.12 As this Article 
shows, that is no longer the case. And the prior work has not 
grappled with how this transformation in the rollback process 
will substantially change rulemaking and electoral strategies. 
Neither has any attention been paid to how the obscure rollback 
tools used aggressively by the Trump administration are chang-
ing our understanding of presidential power. 
This Article is the first to identify and analyze this trend in 
aggressive regulatory rollbacks by the Trump administration.13 
 
 12. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Limits of Executive Power: The Obama-
Trump Transition, 96 NEB. L. REV. 545, 551 (2018) (discussing actions to with-
draw or rescind rules); Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Prob-
lems (So Far) of Trump’s Deregulatory Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 30, 
30 n.100 (2018) (discussing the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking require-
ment); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary 
Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515 (2018) (discussing rulemaking procedures un-
der the APA). 
 13. Gillian Metzger has addressed the Trump administration’s deregula-
tory efforts while analyzing a broader effort to deconstruct the administrative 
state, see Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State 
Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017), but this Article takes a different 
perspective by looking at the impact of the Trump administration’s deregulatory 
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It argues that the new rollback tools are likely to cause an en-
during transformation in presidential strategies and to prompt 
a reconceptualization of Executive Branch power. Future presi-
dents, including for these purposes Trump himself, will need to 
face the possibility that their regulatory output could be undone. 
And this will have ripple effects across the regulatory and elec-
toral spheres.  
Part I begins by describing the Trump administration’s 
novel approach to regulatory rollbacks. The administration fo-
cused on three previously low-profile strategies: disapprovals 
under the Congressional Review Act, abeyances in pending liti-
gation, and suspensions of final regulations. In contrast, prior 
presidents exercised their powers to dismantle part of a previous 
president’s legacy by making use of stop-work orders issued by 
the White House Chief of Staff on Inauguration Day and using 
regulatory repeals or replacements. Stop-work orders allow a 
president to instruct agencies to discontinue all work on rules 
that have not yet been finalized and to withdraw final rules that 
have not yet been published in the Federal Register.14 Repeal and 
replacements allow a president to change the requirements of a 
prior finalized rule.15 
The strategy of stop-work orders has proved effective for dis-
carding proposed rules.16 But while the stop-work orders have at 
 
efforts on presidential incentives both inside and outside of the administrative 
sphere.  
 14. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agen-
cies, 82 Fed. Reg. 8346 (Jan. 24, 2017) (instructing agencies not to submit any 
proposed or final regulations to the Office of the Federal Register and to with-
draw any rules that had already been submitted to the Office but not yet pub-
lished); Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009) (same); Memorandum for the Heads and Act-
ing Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 
2001) (same); Regulatory Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993) (instructing 
agencies not to send any proposed or final regulation to the Federal Register for 
publication until it has been approved by a presidential-appointee); Postpone-
ment of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,227, 11,227 (Feb. 6, 1981) (in-
structing agencies to “refrain, for 60 days following the date of this memoran-
dum, from promulgating any final rule”). 
 15. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009) 
(discussing the standard of review for agencies to make a policy change). 
 16. With some exceptions, it is relatively easy to withdraw proposals, see 
In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Oklahoma Pruitt 
v. McCarthy, No. 15-0369, 2015 WL 4414384, at *5 (N.D. Okla. 2015), and final 
rules that have not yet been published, see Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But see Jacob E. Gersen 
& Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in 
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times also sought to require or encourage agencies to go further 
and suspend recently finalized rules without notice and com-
ment,17 the courts have generally not approved of those types of 
suspensions.18 As a result, the effort had limited scope and cov-
ered only a small fraction of the prior administration’s regula-
tory output.  
Repeals and replacements do not have any temporal limita-
tion, but three factors make this tool of limited use as well. First, 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) “arbitrary and capri-
cious” standard and notice and comment requirements both ap-
ply to agencies attempting to repeal or replace rules.19 Agencies 
must provide a “reasoned explanation” for changing course, show 
awareness of a changed position, and give “good reasons for the 
new policy.”20 In addition, when the prior regulation is supported 
by facts or a well-conducted cost-benefit analysis, an agency 
faces a significant hurdle in the requirement to explain its rea-
sons for “disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or 
were engendered by the prior policy.”21 As a result of all these 
 
the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1188 (2009) (describing lim-
ited circumstances where withdrawals may be challenged). 
 17. Several stop-work orders (issued by Reagan, Bush, Obama, and Trump) 
have instructed agencies to delay the effective dates of finalized rules. See Post-
ponement of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. at 11,227 (instructing agencies 
“[t]o the extent permitted by law” to postpone the effective dates of final but-
not-yet-effective regulations by sixty days); Memorandum for the Heads and 
Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7702 (in-
structing agencies to postpone the effective date of final regulations by sixty 
days, subject to an exception for emergency or other urgent situations related 
to health or safety); Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4435 (instructing agencies to “[c]onsider extending for 
sixty days the effective date” of regulations that have been published, but not 
yet taken effect); Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8346 (instructing agencies “as permitted by applicable 
law” to postpone the effective dates of regulations that had been published in 
the Federal Register “but have not taken effect”). 
 18. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 818 (D.C. Cir. 
1983); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 762 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 19. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 20. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 
515 (2009); accord Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 
(2016) (holding that where the agency’s prior rule had engendered “significant 
reliance interests” a “summary discussion” explaining a changed position was 
insufficient). 
 21. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 516. 
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procedural requirements, regulations can be “sticky” and diffi-
cult to change.22  
Second, because the APA requirements make changing a 
regulation extremely resource intensive for an agency, the 
agency may be limited in the number it can undertake at one 
time.23 Third, the difficulty of changing a regulation through reg-
ulatory procedures is compounded when a regulation has al-
ready gone into effect and the regulated industry has purchased 
durable equipment to comply with the regulation or modified its 
production processes, as typically happens with environmental, 
health, and safety regulations. A repeal under these circum-
stances will forgo benefits but will not save the costs that have 
already been sunk. Thus, such a repeal will look unattractive as 
a matter of policy and will be vulnerable to judicial review.24  
In its zeal to set aside its predecessor’s regulatory accom-
plishments, the Trump administration sought to reach a broader 
set of regulations than those covered by the traditional stop-
work orders through the use of disapprovals under the Congres-
sional Review Act, abeyances in pending litigation, and suspen-
sions of final regulations. More than two years into the Trump 
administration, it is possible to assess the success of these tactics 
and their impact on the Executive Branch’s ability to engage in 
regulatory policymaking.  
The first of these tools—disapprovals under the Congres-
sional Review Act—allowed the Trump administration to di-
rectly repeal rules without regard to the APA’s requirements.25 
Prior to the Trump administration, Congress had disapproved of 
only one regulation through the Congressional Review Act: an 
ergonomics rule promulgated by the Department of Labor under 
 
 22. Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 90, 123 
(2018); see also Bethany A. Davis Noll & Denise A. Grab, Deregulation: Process 
and Procedures that Govern Agency Decisionmaking in an Era of Rollbacks, 38 
ENERGY L.J. 269 (2017) (describing procedures that make it difficult to reverse 
course); Kagan, supra note 11, at 2264 (describing research on the rigidity and 
ossification of agency rulemaking); Mendelson, supra note 10, at 592–93 (same). 
 23. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification 
Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 
1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1423–25, 1439–40 (2012) (discussing 
the ossification of agency regulation). 
 24. See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 515–16 (requiring an 
agency to provide “a more detailed justification” for a change in the regulation 
“when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests”). 
 25. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2012). 
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President Bill Clinton.26 In contrast, early in the Trump admin-
istration, fourteen regulations suffered this fate.27 Congressional 
Review Act disapprovals are particularly valuable because they 
put an immediate end to the rule in question. In fact, they are 
more effective than a regulatory repeal because under the terms 
of the Act, regulations that are “substantially the same” as the 
disapproved rule cannot be promulgated in the future without 
congressional authorization28—a very high bar in our current 
era of congressional gridlock.29 As a result, of the three rollback 
strategies, Congressional Review Act disapprovals have been the 
most effective.  
In contrast to disapprovals under the Congressional Review 
Act, the other two rollback tools that the Trump administration 
has used in an uncharacteristically aggressive manner—abey-
ances in pending litigation and suspensions—require control of 
only the presidency and thus they may be wielded in inter-party 
transitions where the president’s party does not control Con-
gress. In addition, the use of these tools is not limited by the 
strict timing rules in the Congressional Review Act30 or by the 
fact that using Senate debate time to disapprove of a regulation 
early in a new administration requires a difficult tradeoff be-
tween confirming senior Executive Branch officials, including 
cabinet members, and voting on disapprovals.31  
Under the second tool, abeyances in pending litigation, 
courts place a hold on any further briefing, argument, or decision 
in a challenge to a pending rule while the administration consid-
ers whether to change that rule.32 Many administrations have 
 
 26. Joint Resolution Providing for Congressional Disapproval of the Rule 
Submitted by the Department of Labor Under Chapter 8 of Title 5, United 
States Code, Relating to Ergonomics, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001). 
 27. See Congressional Review Act Resolutions in the 115th Congress, COA-
LITION FOR SENSIBLE SAFEGUARDS, https://sensiblesafeguards.org/cra [https:// 
perma.cc/T6JQ-B69S] (providing a full list of rules that have been disapproved). 
In November 2017 and May 2018, the Trump administration also disapproved 
a guidance and regulation issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
Id.; see also infra note 89. 
 28. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). 
 29. See Revesz, supra note 9, at 1518–25 (discussing gridlock). 
 30. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(d) (listing the timing rules for Congressional Review 
Act disapprovals); see also infra Part I.A.1 (discussing impact of timing rules).  
 31. See 5 U.S.C. § 802(d) (listing rules for Senate debate and the vote). 
 32. See, e.g., Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]e can hold the case in abeyance pending resolution of the proposed rule-
making.”); Order, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2016). 
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used abeyances, though prior to the Trump administration, 
abeyances were requested only in cases that were still in the 
early stages, prior to the completion of briefing.33 In contrast, the 
Trump administration has sought abeyances in a significant 
number of cases in which briefing was complete and where oral 
argument had already taken place months earlier, such as in the 
challenge to the Clean Power Plan, the Obama-era regulation 
designed to cut carbon dioxide emissions from existing power 
plants.34 Placing cases in abeyance can be helpful to a new ad-
ministration in a number of ways. If a court previously stayed 
the rule pending the completion of the litigation, as was the case 
for the Clean Power Plan,35 an abeyance extends the life of that 
litigation and hence the duration of the court stay.36 Even where 
the abeyance does not keep a regulation from going into effect, it 
can avoid a decision upholding the challenged rule, which could 
otherwise complicate the agency’s efforts to repeal that rule.37  
The third tool that the Trump administration used to an un-
precedented extent in the effort to dismantle Obama-era regula-
tions involved suspending (or postponing, delaying, and staying) 
regulations while the agencies work on plans to repeal or amend 
the targeted rules.38 With suspensions, agencies can use the lack 
of implementation to make a subsequent repeal seem less signif-
 
 33. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 551 (describing practice); infra Part 
I.B.1. 
 34. See infra Part I.B.2.  
 35. See Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016). 
 36. Cf. Order, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2016). 
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 113–22. 
 38. Agencies have labeled these actions “suspensions,” see Notice for Sus-
pension of Small Area Fair Market Rent (Small Area FMR), 82 Fed. Reg. 58,439 
(Dec. 12, 2017), “postponements,” see Postponement of Certain Compliance 
Dates for Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric 
Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005 (Apr. 25, 2017); 
“delays,” see Delay of Effective Date for 30 Final Regulations Published by the 
Environmental Protection Agency Between October 28, 2016 and January 17, 
2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 26, 2017); “stays,” see Stay of Standards of Per-
formance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills and Emission Guidelines and 
Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 82 Fed. Reg. 24,878 
(May 31, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); or “revisions,” see Refuse to 
Accept Procedures for Premarket Tobacco Product Submissions, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8894 (Feb. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1105). Despite the different 
terminology used, all these actions have fundamentally the same effect of sus-
pending the original rule, and thus this Article uses the term “suspension” to 
refer to them. 
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icant and the cost savings of such a repeal seem more signifi-
cant,39 which can help them in any challenge to the repeal. Many 
courts have struck down Trump-era suspensions.40 But even 
with the poor win rate, the tool has remained successful. As com-
mentators have noted, because of the short-term quality of sus-
pensions and the fact that the administration can either replace 
the rule or withdraw the delay, legal disputes over them often 
end up unresolved.41 After the negative reception of the Trump 
administration’s efforts in court and what may be seen as a 
“Trump taint,” suspensions may be a less promising tool for a 
subsequent administration, yet subsequent administrations are 
still likely to find this tool useful.  
In Part II, this Article discusses two factors that make it 
likely that the Trump administration’s aggressive regulatory 
strategy will prompt a fundamental and enduring transfor-
mation in presidential administration. First, subsequent presi-
dents are likely to have powerful incentives to use similar play-
books to try to undo the regulations of their immediate 
predecessors following an inter-party transition. As long as the 
legislative filibuster remains in place, congressional gridlock will 
continue to put pressure on presidents to seek policy wins in the 
regulatory arena.42 
In this climate, a Democratic president is not likely to shy 
away from following the aggressive approach mapped out by the 
Trump administration after the next inter-party transition. Both 
the Democratic and Republican parties have participated in tit-
 
 39. See U.S. ENVT’L. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: RE-
CONSIDERATION OF THE 2017 AMENDMENTS TO THE ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PRE-
VENTION REQUIREMENTS: RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS UNDER THE CLEAN 
AIR ACT, SECTION 112(r)(7), REGULATIONS.GOV, at 38–39 (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0907 
[https://perma.cc/8YDF-R9E5] (taking credit in proposed rescission for saving 
full compliance costs after suspension of the rule). 
 40. See, e.g., Air All. Hous. v. EPA, 906 F.3d 1049, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2018); 
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat. Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 95, 115 
(2d Cir. 2018); Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 41. See Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. 
REV. 947, 993 (2003) (stating some of the delay questions “are unlikely to ever 
be resolved”); see also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political 
Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 530 (2011) (discussing the legal issues that 
arise with suspensions); infra Part I.C.3 (describing this feature of suspensions). 
 42. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2248 (explaining how President Clinton 
“turned to the bureaucracy” to achieve his policy goals). 
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for-tat political behavior lately.43 And because the parties are be-
coming more polarized and finding common ground between 
them is less possible,44 future administrations will be under sim-
ilar pressure to use these aggressive tools to cut back on the prior 
administration’s policies as much as possible. For example, if 
President Trump is succeeded by Democratic control of the pres-
idency, House, and Senate, the temptation to make the most use 
of the Congressional Review Act is likely to be irresistible. In 
2017, when Republicans invoked the Congressional Review Act, 
Democrats complained bitterly about the lack of a public process 
in Congressional Review Act disapprovals, which take place with 
no hearings, reports, or public scrutiny of their rationales.45 But 
not using this tool leaves important policy opportunities on the 
table. Congressional niceties are thus likely to be sacrificed. The 
same incentives exist for continuing to make aggressive use of 
abeyances and suspensions.  
Second, the risks posed by these three tools are made more 
significant by the fact that major policy-oriented rules can take 
a substantial amount of time to propose, promulgate, implement, 
and shepherd through litigation. Though a president could turn 
towards more use of “unorthodox rulemaking,”–the use of exec-
utive orders and “quasi-rules such as guidance” to accomplish 
 
 43. See, e.g., John T. Bennett, Trump vs. Pelosi: 5 Takeaways from Their 
Tit-For-Tat as Shutdown Plods On, ROLL CALL (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www 
.rollcall.com/news/trump-vs-pelosi-five-takeaways-tit-tat-shutdown-plods 
[https://perma.cc/8344-X2H4] (discussing tit-for-tat dynamics on the winter 
2019 government shutdown); Nina Totenberg, Trump, Republicans Continue 
Remaking the Federal Courts – Even as Senate on Recess, NPR (Oct. 27, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/27/660643999/trump-republicans-continue 
-remaking-the-federal-courts-even-as-senate-on-recess [https://perma.cc/9A9V 
-97JB] (discussing escalation on judicial nominations). 
 44. Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitu-
tional Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1701–05 (2015); Joseph Fishkin 
& David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
915, 959–60 (2018). 
 45. See Laura Barron-Lopez & Arthur Delaney, Republicans Are Using an 
Arcane Tool to Handcuff Federal Agencies, HUFFPOST (Feb. 19, 2017), https:// 
www.huffpost.com/entry/republicans-cra-federal-agencies_n_58a7776ae 
4b045cd34c1a44c [https://perma.cc/GHG5-A6W9] (quoting Sen. Ben Cardin, 
Democrat of Maryland, saying “[w]hat the Senate did with the CRA . . . is out-
rageous”); Thomas O. McGarity, The Congressional Review Act: A Damage As-
sessment, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 6, 2018), https://prospect.org/article/ 
congressional-review-act-damage-assessment [https://perma.cc/FX7P-NQLA]. 
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her objections46–economically significant regulations are likely 
to remain at the core of a president’s priorities. The process for 
preparing and finalizing a rule can take two to three years, and 
sometimes even longer.47 As a result, rules are likely to be final-
ized close to the end of a president’s term when they are at risk 
of a Congressional Review Act disapproval (or abeyances in 
pending litigation and suspensions). Judicial review, itself, can 
take more than a year.48 Thus, even if a regulation is safe from 
a Congressional Review Act disapproval, a pending challenge at 
the end of the president’s term can open the door to an abeyance 
request if a president of the other party is elected. In addition, a 
rule’s compliance deadlines could stretch the timeline out for 
several more years, during which time the rule is also at risk of 
a suspension. Thus, even rules that are finalized early enough to 
be safe from Congressional Review Act disapprovals and abey-
ances might be subject to suspensions so long as compliance 
deadlines remain in the future.  
Part III looks at the regulatory and electoral incentives that 
this emerging state of affairs is likely to place on future presi-
dents. Future presidents will need to consider making signifi-
cant adjustments to their regulatory activities to preserve their 
legacy in this new era of aggressive rollbacks. From the very be-
ginning of a new administration, presidents will need to change 
the way in which notice-and-comment rulemaking is conducted, 
and may need to undertake substantial regulatory work even be-
fore Inauguration Day. Electoral incentives are also likely to 
change. For example, first-term presidents will need to change 
how they have traditionally weighed the decision about whether 
they should postpone regulatory initiatives until their second 
term to increase their probability of reelection. And two-term 
presidents will have a significant additional incentive to have 
their party control at least one chamber of Congress at the end 
of their term to avoid Congressional Review Act disapprovals. 
Part IV explains how President Trump’s strategies have 
ushered in an important reconceptualization of the nature of 
presidential power. With the low probability of legislative wins, 
presidents are likely to continue to focus on regulatory policy 
making. But a president’s ability to make long-lasting policy 
 
 46. See Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rule-
making, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1800–03 (2015) (discussing unorthodox prac-
tices). 
 47. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 48. See infra text accompanying notes 295–97. 
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through regulatory change is likely to depend on winning two—
rather than just one—national elections. With this change, the 
Executive Branch may come to share common characteristics 
with political systems, like some states or foreign countries, in 
which multiple popular elections or multiple votes by a legisla-
ture are needed for constitutional amendments.49 Thus, examin-
ing the justifications that undergird these multiple-vote require-
ments—legitimacy, stability, and quality50—is a good way of 
assessing the normative value of this shift. Looking at the new 
requirement that a president survive reelection through that 
lens demonstrates that there is little normative support for this 
reconceptualization. Nonetheless, future presidents will need to 
adjust to this new reality.  
The Article concludes with a brief discussion of “what next,” 
and as part of that discussion, addresses factors that could stop 
this reconceptualization of the Executive Branch in its tracks. 
Among those factors would be an end to the filibuster for legis-
lation or major changes in doctrines governing the judicial re-
view of administrative action. But the Article concludes that 
those factors are unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.  
I.  TOOLS TO REVERSE REGULATORY POLICYMAKING   
Given the importance that recent presidents have attached 
to their regulatory agenda, it should not be surprising that pres-
idents, aided by Congress, have developed tools to dismantle a 
previous president’s agenda. But the Trump administration has 
taken three relatively low-profile tools—Congressional Review 
Act disapprovals, abeyances in pending litigation, and regula-
tory suspensions—to a whole new level. These tools had been 
used by prior presidents, but to a far lesser extent. The Trump 
administration’s new and more aggressive use of these tools has 
put a greater proportion of a prior president’s agenda at risk 
than had previously been the case. In this Part, we describe the 
use of Congressional Review Act disapprovals, abeyances in 
 
 49. See John Dinan, Constitutional Amendment Procedure: By the Legisla-
ture, in THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 11(Audrey S. 
Wall et al. eds., 2016 ed. 2016) (listing requirements for approval of proposed 
constitutional amendments in legislature); see also infra Part IV.A.1 (describing 
multiple-vote requirements at the state level and in foreign countries). 
 50. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance 
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless 
Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 22 
(2010) (discussing the stability of the election system). 
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pending litigation, and regulatory suspensions and show how 
the Trump administration departed from prior practices. We 
also explain how each tool is likely to remain useful for future 
administrations.  
A. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT  
The Congressional Review Act allows Congress to repeal 
regulations through streamlined procedures. This Section de-
scribes the history and prior administrations’ use of the Congres-
sional Review Act and explains how the Trump administration—
along with Congress—used the Act to repeal a far greater num-
ber of regulations than had ever been repealed under the Act 
before.  
1. History and Purpose 
On March 29, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Con-
gressional Review Act, which was part of the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.51 Previously, Con-
gress had used a one-house or two-house legislative veto to dis-
approve of agency rules.52 But in Immigration & Naturalization 
Service v. Chadha, a 1983 decision, the Supreme Court closed 
this option, holding that a congressional veto over actions of the 
Executive Branch improperly circumvented the Constitution’s 
requirement of bicameralism and presentment.53  
Congress responded by passing the Congressional Review 
Act through a bipartisan vote.54 Under the Congressional Re-
view Act, Congress can disapprove of a regulation, which renders 
the regulation “of no force or effect.”55 After a disapproval, the 
regulation that was in effect immediately before the disapproved 
rule again becomes the effective regulation.56 In addition, an 
 
 51. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 657 (2012). 
 52. Note, Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
2162, 2164 (2009). 
 53. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983). 
 54. The House voted to pass the Act 328-91, with 201 Republicans and 127 
Democrats voting yes; approximately thirty Republicans and sixty Democrats 
voted no. 142 CONG. REC. H2986 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996). The Senate passed 
the Act unanimously. 142 CONG. REC. S2316 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996). 
 55. 5 U.S.C. § 801(f).  
 56. Id.; see Congressional Nullification of the Stream Protection Rule Un-
der the Congressional Review Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 54,924 (Nov. 17, 2017) (to be 
codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700–01, 773–74, 777, 779–80, 783–85, 800, 816–17, 
824 and 827) (explaining that after disapproval of the Stream Protection Act, 
the regulation’s text would revert to the “regulatory text in effect immediately 
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agency cannot issue another rule that is “substantially the same” 
as the disapproved rule unless authorized to do so in subsequent 
legislation.57 
 The Act can serve as a particularly useful tool for a new 
president and Congress of the same party for reviewing the ac-
tions of the prior president of the opposite party for two rea-
sons.58 First, the Act bypasses the usual sixty-vote requirement 
to advance legislation in the Senate,59 thus facilitating more par-
tisan disapprovals than would otherwise be possible.60  
Second, the Act’s timing rules help enable disapprovals dur-
ing a political transition. The Act requires that all agencies re-
port rules to Congress.61 Once Congress receives this report, it 
has sixty legislative working days to introduce a special joint res-
olution of disapproval of the rule.62 When Congress begins a new 
term, as it does after a presidential election, the statute provides 
that the review period restarts for anything finalized within the 
last sixty days of the last Congress, and that all the rules that 
were finalized within this period then become subject to review 
and disapproval by the new Congress for an additional seventy-
five legislative days.63 Though the exact timing varies because 
 
prior to January 19, 2017, the effective date of the Stream Protection Rule”); see 
also Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 767–69 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(vacating a suspension rule and making clear that the original rule’s deadlines 
were back in effect); Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Man-
agement Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 62,268, 62,269 (Dec. 
3, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68) (explaining that the amendments to 
the Accidental Release Prevention Requirements for Risk Management Pro-
grams under the Clean Air Act were in effect after a court decision vacating the 
agency’s suspension of the rule).  
 57. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2); see also MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES-
TIONS 1 (2016). 
 58. CAREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 6; see RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., RL31160, DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY CONGRESS: PROCE-
DURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 14 (2001); Philip A. Wallach & 
Nicholas W. Zeppos, How Powerful Is the Congressional Review Act?, BROOK-
INGS (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-powerful-is-the 
-congressional-review-act/ [https://perma.cc/66QU-M3SB]; Mysteries of the Con-
gressional Review Act, supra note 52, at 2167–69.  
 59. 5 U.S.C. § 802(d)(2). 
 60. CAREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 6; BETH, supra note 58; Mysteries of the 
Congressional Review Act, supra note 52, at 2167–69; Wallach & Zeppos, supra 
note 58. 
 61. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a). 
 62. 5 U.S.C. § 802(a). 
 63. 5 U.S.C. § 801(d); see Daniel R. Pérez, Congressional Review Act Fact 
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the number of legislative days changes with each congressional 
calendar, this timing rule means that a new Congress may be 
able to target regulations issued under a prior administration 
dating back several months64 and that the new Congress may 
have a few months to pass the disapproval resolutions.65 
In contrast, resolutions of disapproval are not as useful dur-
ing non-transition times. Any resolutions passed under the Con-
gressional Review Act require the president’s signature to be-
come law and the president can veto the resolution.66 A veto 
override requires a two-thirds majority of both houses of Con-
gress, as for all legislation.67 Thus, during non-transition times, 
resolutions, even if passed by both chambers of Congress, are 
unlikely to become effective because the president is likely to 
veto a regulation disapproving a regulation promulgated during 
her administration, and a veto override would require bipartisan 
support.68  
 
Sheet, REG. STUD. CTR. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://regulatorystudies.columbian 
.gwu.edu/congressional-review-act-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/QV35-2J57]. 
 64. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
IN10437, AGENCY FINAL RULES SUBMITTED AFTER MAY 16, 2016, MAY BE SUB-
JECT TO DISAPPROVAL IN 2017 UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 2 
(2016) (explaining that the Republican-controlled Congress could target any 
regulations issued under the Obama administration on or after May 16, 2016); 
CURTIS W. COPELAND & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL34633, 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: DISAPPROVAL OF RULES IN A SUBSEQUENT SES-
SION OF CONGRESS at 4–10 (2008) (same); BETH, supra note 58, at 3–6, (explain-
ing timing rules). 
 65. See COALITION FOR SENSIBLE SAFEGUARDS, supra note 27 (explaining 
that the period for Congress to pass disapprovals for regulations issued under 
Obama ended on May 11, 2017). 
 66. DAVIS & BETH, supra note 64; COALITION FOR SENSIBLE SAFEGUARDS, 
supra note 27.  
 67. See DAVIS & BETH, supra note 64. 
 68. During the Obama presidency, after the Democrats lost their majority 
in Congress, members of the Republican-controlled Congress sponsored bills un-
der the Act to disapprove rules issued by the Obama administration, but all of 
the attempts were vetoed. See DAVIS & BETH, supra note 64. Under the Trump 
administration, certain factions in Congress have attempted to use the Act to 
signal opposition to the administration’s policies, even when the resolution has 
no hope of ultimately passing. See Marianne Levine, Senate Votes to Overturn 
Trump Donor Disclosure Rule, POLITICO (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.politico 
.com/story/2018/12/12/senate-democrats-overturn-trump-donor-disclosure 
-1057535 [https://perma.cc/K9KS-5ZV3]. But see infra note 89 (discussing use of 
CRA during non-transition time to disapprove regulations issued by independ-
ent agencies).  
  
2019] REGULATION IN TRANSITION 17 
 
2. Pre-2017 Transitions  
Three inter-party transitions have occurred since the pas-
sage of the Congressional Review Act: from Bill Clinton to 
George W. Bush; from George W. Bush to Barack Obama; and 
from Barack Obama to Donald Trump.69 In all three cases, the 
new president’s party also controlled both chambers of Congress, 
thereby making Congressional Review Act disapprovals a realis-
tic possibility.70 But prior to the Trump administration, the Act 
had been successfully used only once.71 In November 2000, while 
the results of the presidential election were still being contested, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
promulgated the Ergonomics Rule requiring employers to take 
measures to reduce ergonomic injuries in the workplace.72 
But the Small Business Administration claimed that OSHA 
had vastly underestimated the cost to employers and vigorously 
objected to the rule.73 And in March 2001, after George W. Bush’s 
election, the 107th Congress voted to overturn the regulation un-
der the Congressional Review Act.74 The disapproval of the Er-
gonomics Rule passed the Senate, which at the time was evenly 
split between Republicans and Democrats (but controlled by Re-
publicans because of the possibility of vice presidential tie 
 
 69. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 243 (2018).  
 70. See PARTY DIVISION, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/ 
partydiv.htm (providing party breakdown in the Senate for each Congress); 
PARTY DIVISIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, 1789 to Present, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party 
-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ (same for House); see also Larkin, Jr., supra note 69, 
at 243. 
 71. Michael D. Shear, Trump Discards Obama Legacy, One Rule at a Time, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/ 
trump-overturning-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/KW9C-YG9R]. In gen-
eral, it has been difficult for Congress to engage in systematic oversight of 
agency decision-making due to “institutional and political obstacles.” Mendel-
son, supra note 10, at 570, 648 (describing congressional oversight of agency 
decisions as “relatively ad hoc” and “fragmented”).  
 72. Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262 (Nov. 14, 2000) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910); see also Robert Pear, After Long Delay, U.S. Plans to Issue 
Ergonomics Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/ 
11/22/us/after-long-delay-us-plans-to-issue-ergonomic-rules.html. 
 73. Pear, supra note 72. 
 74. See Ergonomics Program Final Rule Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,403 (Apr. 
23, 2001) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910); Mysteries of Congressional Re-
moval Act, supra note 52, at 2170. 
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breaks),75 with 50 Republicans and 6 Democrats voting yes.76 In 
the Republican-controlled House, 206 Republicans, 16 Demo-
crats, and 1 Independent voted for the disapproval.77 President 
Bush subsequently signed the resolution of disapproval and the 
Ergonomics Rule was invalidated.78  
That was the last time the Act was used before the Trump 
administration. During the same George W. Bush transition pe-
riod, there were a few other attempts by members of Congress to 
use the Congressional Review Act to disapprove of regulations 
issued in the last days of the Clinton Administration, but they 
were unsuccessful.79 At the beginning of the Obama presidency, 
the Democratic majorities did not use the Congressional Review 
Act to undo any Bush-era rules.80 Though the Bush administra-
tion had attempted to minimize the number of late-term rules it 
finalized,81 there were thirty-two rules that may have been eli-
gible for disapproval.82 But rather than resort to using the Con-
gressional Review Act, the Obama administration focused its 
early attention on filling cabinet and subcabinet positions and 
 
 75. The Unforgettable 107th Congress, U.S. SENATE (Nov. 22, 2002), 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/unforgettable_107th_ 
congress.htm [https://perma.cc/C3J5-5K9R]. 
 76. 147 CONG. REC. 2873 (2001). The 107th Congress had 220 Republicans, 
213 Democrats, and 2 Independents in the House. CONGRESS PROFILES, 107TH 
CONGRESS (2001–2003), http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/ 
Profiles/107th/ [https://perma.cc/4MXT-5XBJ]. The Senate had 50 Republicans 
and 50 Democrats. U.S. SENATE, supra note 75. 
 77. S.J. Res. 6 (107th): Ergonomics Regulations Resolution, GOVTRACK.US 
(Mar. 7, 2001, 7:26 PM), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/107-2001/h33 
[https://perma.cc/RB73-D4JN]. 
 78. Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, supra note 52, at 2170. 
 79. MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30116, CONGRES-
SIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE 9–10 (2008) (listing resolutions). 
 80. There were 257 Democrats and 178 Republicans in the House and 58 
Democrats; 2 Independents, who caucused with the Democrats; and 40 Repub-
licans in the Senate. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40086, 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE 111TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2009). 
 81. Mysteries of Congressional Removal Act, supra note 52, at 2174; Mem-
orandum from Joshua B. Bolten, White House Chief of Staff, to the Heads of 
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (May 9, 2008), http://policyintegrity.org/documents/ 
BoltenMemo050908.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH4Y-YSVG]. 
 82. Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, supra note 52, at 2175; see 
also O’Connell, supra note 41, at 472 (describing numerous midnight regula-
tions issued in the waning days of the Bush presidency). 
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used regular rulemaking procedures, rather than the Congres-
sional Review Act, to overturn at least some of the targeted 
rules.83  
3. The Trump Administration’s Record 
Despite having been used successfully only once in the first 
twenty years of its existence, the Congressional Review Act re-
ceived significant interest after the November 2016 election, in 
which Republicans gained unified control of government.84 The 
Congressional Research Service estimated that Congress could 
target any completed rules submitted to Congress for disap-
proval on or after June 13, 2016.85 In addition, Congress had un-
til early May 2017, to pass the disapproval resolutions.86 
In January 2017, as soon as the new administration and 
Congress were sworn in and with the clock ticking on the sixty-
legislative-day limit, congressional Republicans got to work dis-
approving Obama-era regulations.87 Congress passed fourteen 
 
 83. Rescission of the Regulation Entitled “Ensuring that Department of 
Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory 
Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law” Proposal, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,207 
(proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88); Adam M. Finkel & 
Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of the “Substantially Similar” 
Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word (Er-
gonomics) Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 728–29 (2011); Mysteries of Congres-
sional Removal Act, supra note 52, at 2176; Emily E. Williams, HHS Proposes 
Rescission of Conscience Rule, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 19, 2009), https://www.lexology 
.com/library/detail.aspx?g=197683f9-eceb-4c3f-9d8f-a1dc99384d51  
[https://perma.cc/G6W2-LG5X]. 
 84. After the election, both the House and the Senate had Republican ma-
jorities. The House had 236 Republicans, 197 Democrats, and two vacant seats. 
JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44762, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
115TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2018). The Senate had fifty-one Republicans, 
forty-seven Democrats, and two Independents, who both caucused with the 
Democrats. See id. 
 85. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., IN10437, AGENCY FINAL RULES SUBMITTED ON OR AFTER JUNE 13, 2016, 
MAY BE SUBJECT TO DISAPPROVAL BY THE 115TH CONGRESS (2016). 
 86. See id.  
 87. See Brian Naylor, Republicans Are Using an Obscure Law to Repeal 
Some Obama-Era Regulations, NPR (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/ 
04/09/523064408/republicans-are-using-an-obscure-law-to-repeal-some-obama 
-era-regulations [perma.cc/SYY2-3ENZ]; Shear, supra note 71; John J. Vec-
chione, Opinion, The Congressional Review Act and a Regulatory Agenda for 
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joint resolutions of disapproval, which were all signed by Presi-
dent Trump.88 The fourteen disapproved regulations included 
four environmental regulations as well as regulations covering 
diverse topics such as health care and limits on gun ownership 
for the mentally ill.89 
The main constraints on the use of the Congressional Re-
view Act to disapprove of Obama-era rules were the provision for 
ten hours of debate in the Senate for each disapproval,90 and the 
Act’s limit on the number of legislative days that the new Con-
gress had to pass the resolutions.91 Likely as a result of these 
constraints, in early 2017, Congress targeted but did not succeed 
in repealing eighteen other rules.92 
 
 88. COALITION FOR SENSIBLE SAFEGUARDS, supra note 27. 
 89. Id.; see Alex Guillén, GOP Onslaught on Obama’s ‘Midnight Rules’ 
Comes to an End, POLITICO (May 7, 2017, 7:10 AM), https://www.politico.com/ 
story/2017/05/07/obama-regulations-gop-midnight-rules-238051 [https://perma 
.cc/8K7S-JD9D]. In addition to disapproving the fourteen Obama-era regula-
tions during those initial sixty days, in 2017, Congress also disapproved a rule 
and a guidance promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
early during the Trump administration. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BU-
REAU, INDIRECT AUTO LENDING AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUAL CREDIT OP-
PORTUNITY ACT (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_ 
march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR7W-S2JH]; Repealing 
the CFPB’s Arbitration Rule, REG. REV. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www 
.theregreview.org/2017/11/06/repealing-cfpb-arbitration-rule/ [https://perma.cc/ 
U2Z4-9N9K]. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is an independent 
agency whose head does not serve at the will of the President. See Kirti Datla 
& Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive 
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 786 (2013). As a result, in 2017, when those 
disapprovals were issued, the agency still had an Obama-appointed head, Rich-
ard Cordray. There is debate about whether disapproving a guidance document 
is meaningful. See Keith Bradley & Larisa Vaysman, CRA Resolutions Against 
Agency Guidance Are Meaningless, REG. REV. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www 
.theregreview.org/2018/09/20/bradley-vaysman-cra-resolutions-agency 
-guidance-meaningless/ [https://perma.cc/2H72-NQXA]. 
 90. 5 U.S.C. § 802(d)(2) (2012). The Midnight Rules Relief Act of 2017, 
which passed the House in 2017 but not the Senate, would allow Congress to 
use the Congressional Review Act to bundle multiple regulations issued within 
the last year of the previous presidential term into one disapproval resolution. 
H.R. 21, 115th Cong. (2017). But as long as the filibuster remains in place, the 
Midnight Rules Relief Act is not likely to pass. See infra text accompanying 
notes 526–30 (discussing the likelihood that the filibuster will remain in place). 
 91. 5 U.S.C. § 801(d) (2012). 
 92. COALITION FOR SENSIBLE SAFEGUARDS, supra note 27; see also Eric Lip-
ton & Jasmine C. Lee, Which Obama-Era Rules Are Being Reversed in the 
Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2017/05/01/us/politics/trump-obama-regulations-reversed.html 
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In addition, in one prominent case, the use of the Congres-
sional Review Act was rejected. The House passed a resolution, 
disapproving the Department of Interior’s regulation restricting 
methane pollution at mining facilities, known as the Waste Pre-
vention Rule, but that resolution failed to pass the Senate on a 
49-51 vote, when Republican Senators Collins, Graham, and 
McCain refused to vote for it.93 Senator McCain explained that 
he had voted against the measure because of his concern that the 
agency could otherwise be blocked from issuing future methane 
regulations under the statute’s bar against “substantially the 
same” regulations.94  
4. Future Uses 
The successful use of the Congressional Review Act during 
the Trump administration demonstrates that it is a powerful tool 
to attack a prior president’s legacy, assuming the new presi-
dent’s party also controls both branches of Congress. Moreover, 
future administrations will have to weigh using limited Senate 
time for confirming presidential appointments against using 
that time for Congressional Review Act disapprovals.95 The 
Obama and Trump administrations both engaged in this calcu-
lation, reaching opposite conclusions. 
In addition, future administrations will need to consider the 
impact of the statute’s bar on promulgating “substantially the 
same” regulations absent congressional authorization.96 There is 
some uncertainty in how the term should be interpreted. The 
Congressional Review Act does not define the meaning or scope 
of the term, what criteria should be considered, or which institu-
tion should make such a determination, and the issue has never 
 
[https://perma.cc/AF86-SJW2] (discussing regulations brought to Congress to be 
reversed). 
 93. H.R.J. Res. 36, 115th Cong. (2017); 163 CONG. REC. S2852 (daily ed. 
May 10, 2017). 
 94. Tom DiChristopher, John McCain Just Delivered Trump a Rare Loss in 
His Bid to Roll Back Energy Rules, CNBC (May 10, 2017), https://www.cnbc 
.com/2017/05/10/mccain-delivered-trump-a-rare-loss-in-his-bid-to-kill-energy 
-rules.html [https://perma.cc/F54G-E7S6]. 
 95. Cf. Midnight Rulemaking: Shedding Some Light: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 23 (2009) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler) (remarking on the 
need to “pass an economic recovery package, finalize FY 2009 appropriations 
bills, and prepare for a new budget for the upcoming fiscal year”). 
 96. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b) (2012). 
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been litigated.97 Despite that uncertainty, the statute likely bars 
an agency from issuing a new rule with a new explanation or 
cosmetic changes,98 as well as a rule accomplishing essentially 
the same purpose.99 For example, as Senator McCain feared, dis-
approving the Department of Interior’s Waste Prevention Rule 
could bar Interior from issuing a future regulation similarly 
aimed at cutting waste in oil and gas mining.100  
The bar may not otherwise be that much of a concern 
though. For a future anti-regulatory president, the bar would not 
present too much of an obstacle. The idea that an agency in a 
subsequent administration would be barred from regulating in 
that area would likely be considered a plus. And even for a pro-
regulatory administration, the “substantially the same” bar 
might not be all that significant. First, if the prior administra-
tion had issued a series of repeals and rollbacks, like the Trump 
administration has done,101 a subsequent administration’s Con-
gressional Review Act disapproval of a repeal would probably not 
stand in the way of a measure regulating the activity because a 
rule that accomplished the exact opposite of a repeal is unlikely 
to be deemed “substantially the same” as the repeal.102  
 
 97. CAREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 16–17; see also Daniel Cohen & Peter L. 
Strauss, Recent Developments: Regulatory Reform & the 104th Congress: Con-
gressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 104 (1997); 
Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 83, at 740–42; Julie A. Parks, Lessons in Politics: 
Initial Use of the Congressional Review Act, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 187, 200–02 
(2003). 
 98. See Larkin, supra note 69, at 250.  
 99. Michael J. Cole, Interpreting the Congressional Review Act: Why the 
Courts Should Assert Judicial Review, Narrowly Construe “Substantially the 
Same,” and Decline to Defer to Agencies Under Chevron, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 53, 
89–90 (2018). 
 100. DiChristopher, supra note 94. 
 101. See, e.g., The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for 
Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 
(Aug. 24, 2018) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 85–86 & 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 
533, 536, 537 & 40) (proposing to reduce existing average fuel economy and car-
bon dioxide emission standards); Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025 Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 16,077 (Apr. 2, 2018) (withdrawing previous Final Determination of the 
Mid-term Evaluation of greenhouse gas emission standards); Repeal of Consol-
idated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 36,934 (Aug. 7, 2017) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 1202 & 1206). 
 102. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 83, at 741 (concluding that the stat-
ute likely does not bar an agency from engaging in “whole categories” of related 
activity). 
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Second, even for rollbacks that are not outright repeals, a 
Congressional Review Act disapproval resolution could be of 
great value to a pro-regulatory administration. Under the Con-
gressional Review Act, a disapproved rule must be “treated as 
though such rule had never taken effect,” allowing the previous 
regulatory regime to come back into effect.103 In the case of an 
administration seeking to reverse course on a rule that weak-
ened the Clean Power Plan, for example, such a disapproval 
would have the salutary effect of putting the Clean Power Plan 
back in place.104 And the disapproval would probably not stand 
in the way of the subsequent promulgation of an even more strin-
gent rule because the strengthening of a standard is unlikely to 
be deemed “substantially the same” as the weakening of that 
standard. 
Also, the impact of the “substantially the same” provision 
may be muted by the Congressional Review Act’s prohibition of 
judicial review over any “determination, finding, action, or omis-
sion” under the statute.105 Most courts that have ruled on this 
question have interpreted the provision to bar review of claims 
that agencies failed to comply with the Congressional Review 
Act’s reporting requirement.106 In light of these rulings, it is pos-
sible that challenges to regulations on the grounds that they are 
“substantially the same” as disapproved ones might similarly 
not be judicially cognizable.  
In sum, the Congressional Review Act is an attractive tool 
for a future administration with unitary party control of the 
presidency, House, and Senate, which seeks to undo its prede-
cessor’s regulatory policies. The use of Senate time early in the 
administration and, to a lesser extent, possible constraints on 
future rulemaking are the main pitfalls to be considered.  
 
 103. 5 U.S.C. § 801(f) (2012). 
 104. Reinstating the Clean Power Plan would, of course, spur new chal-
lenges. See infra Part I.B.2.  
 105. 5 U.S.C. § 805 (2012). 
 106. See, e.g., Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225, 229 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (declining to review amendments of a forest plan by the U.S. 
Forest Service for compliance with the Congressional Review Act reporting re-
quirement); Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 509 F.3d 1259, 1271 n.11 
(10th Cir. 2007) (declining to review compliance with the Congressional Review 
Act in reviewing denial of reimbursement of Medicare depreciation expenses by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services). But see United States v. S. Ind. 
Gas & Elec. Co., IP99-1692-C-M/S, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20936, at *11–18 
(S.D. Ind. Oct. 24, 2002) (holding that court was not barred from reviewing 
EPA’s compliance with the CRA).  
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B. ABEYANCES 
In order to gain an advantage in efforts to roll back the chal-
lenged Obama-era rules, the Trump administration has also 
used another tool—abeyances in pending litigation—in a way 
that goes far beyond what its predecessors ever did. This Section 
describes this tool and shows how the Trump administration ex-
panded the use of abeyances from cases that had not progressed 
far, to cases where briefing was complete, or even where oral ar-
gument had taken place.  
1. Background and Prior Uses 
When an agency contemplates launching a new rulemaking 
that would significantly amend a rule for which judicial review 
is pending, it can be extremely useful to the new administration 
to make sure that the pending challenge remains undecided. 
Abeyances are court orders that put off briefing, argument, and 
decision in the pending case and thus can accomplish this 
task.107 Typically, abeyances in a pending lawsuit are granted to 
allow a new rulemaking to “run its course” and save the judicial 
resources, which would otherwise be involved in deciding the 
pending matter.108 If the agency ultimately revises the chal-
lenged rule in a way that moots the issues in the pending case,109 
the abeyance saves the court the resources that it would have 
expended on that case.110 If the agency decides not to change the 
rule under review, the court can proceed with the pending case, 
avoiding a situation where the challengers are forced to bring a 
new suit.111 In addition, where there is a significant likelihood 
that the decision under review is subject to change, courts prefer 
 
 107. See Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2012); FBME 
Bank Ltd. v. Lew, 142 F. Supp. 3d 70, 73 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 108. Am. Petrol. Inst., 683 F.3d at 386; FBME Bank Ltd., 142 F. Supp. 3d at 
73. 
 109. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71–76 (1997); 
Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 827 F.3d 100, 105–06 (D.C. Cir. 
2016). 
 110. See, e.g., California v. EPA, No. 08-1178, 2009 WL 2912910 (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. 3, 2009) (dropping suit over denial of a waiver to enforce the state’s own 
emission standards after EPA granted California’s waiver); Order, Specialty 
Steel v. EPA, No. 00-1434, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27889* (D.C. Cir. Nov. 28, 
2007) (dismissing suit after abeyance and settlement reached between the par-
ties). 
 111. See Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining 
that the court had granted an abeyance to allow the agency to decide whether 
to reconsider a rule).  
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not to become entangled in an “abstract disagreement[]” while 
the agency reconsiders the rule.112 
The clearest recent example of an abeyance serving the 
needs of a new administration concerns the Clean Power Plan, 
which had been stayed by the Supreme Court, and which the 
Trump administration has now repealed.113 Under its terms, the 
stay was meant to stay in place until the D.C. Circuit decided 
the pending challenge and the Supreme Court reviewed the case, 
through either a denial of certiorari or by deciding the case on 
the merits.114 So the abeyance kept in place a stay of a policy that 
the Trump administration deeply disliked, long enough for the 
rule to be repealed.115  
The Supreme Court’s stay of the Clean Power Plan was ex-
ceptional.116 Even without an ongoing court-issued stay in place, 
however, an abeyance can be useful because it allows the admin-
istration to avoid a decision which might uphold the former ad-
ministration’s rule. For example, should that court find that a 
statute is unambiguous on a particular question, the court’s in-
terpretation of the statute in that case would preclude an 
agency’s attempt to rely on any contrary construction in a re-
write;117 an abeyance protects the agency from this undesirable 
outcome.  
Even where the statute is ambiguous, the abeyance will aid 
the agency. Without an abeyance, if an incoming administration 
disagrees with the legal position in support of the prior admin-
istration’s rule and wants its new views taken into account be-
 
 112. Am. Petrol. Inst., 683 F.3d at 386. 
 113. See Repeal of Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019). 
 114. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016) (granting a stay 
pending applicants’ petitions for review in the Court of Appeals). 
 115. What Is the Clean Power Plan, and How Can Trump Repeal It?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/climate/epa-clean 
-power-plan.html [https://perma.cc/Z68T-J3Q2].  
 116. Jonathan H. Adler, Opinion, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the 
EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court 
-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/HM38-XP44] 
(describing the unprecedented nature of the stay). 
 117. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an 
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior 
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms 
of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”). 
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fore the court decides a case, it would need to file a brief renounc-
ing the government’s prior legal position. But the Justice De-
partment, which represents federal agencies in the courts,118 has 
no authority to change the agency’s policy position119 and gener-
ally disfavors changing the government’s litigation position in 
administrative law cases unless the agency has first repealed or 
modified the rule.120 Even if the Justice Department set aside its 
customary reluctance on this front, the agency could not benefit 
from the various doctrines providing for judicial deference of ad-
ministrative decisions,121 because those doctrines would attach 
to agency decisions following notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and not to representations made by Justice Department law-
yers.122 An abeyance keeps the case on hold until the agency can 
complete the lengthy process. Once the agency has completed 
that process, its new position can benefit from judicial deference. 
This also addresses the Justice Department’s concerns about 
changing its legal position prior to the agency coming to a new 
conclusion itself. 
In addition, avoiding a decision upholding the former ad-
ministration’s rule can help to keep public opinion from solidify-
ing in support of the original rule. For example, the Trump ad-
ministration has been able to work on building political support 
for its change in policy on the Clean Power Plan by decrying the 
illegality of the prior regulation without needing to worry about 
the possibility of a judicial decision upholding that rule.123 And 
 
 118. Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Liti-
gation on Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345–46 (2000); cf. Datla 
& Revesz, supra note 89, at 799–801, 801 n.171 (describing statutes that au-
thorize certain agencies to conduct their own litigation). 
 119. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY: GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, 
AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 5, 37 (1977); Margaret H. Taylor, 
Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy in the Midst of Liti-
gation, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 291–92 (2002). 
 120. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 551 (explaining that the Justice Depart-
ment’s practice in such cases is not to adopt a new view until the agency an-
nounces its decision following notice and comment).  
 121. See generally HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY 
ACTIONS 211–58 (3d ed. 2018) (discussing the various doctrines providing for 
judicial deference of administrative decisions). 
 122. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (explaining the court 
“must judge the propriety” of an agency’s action based on the agency’s reason-
ing). 
 123. See, e.g., Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Ex-
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a future administration seeking to roll back Trump administra-
tion policies could do the same thing.  
But the usual justifications for an abeyance are not as 
strong where there is no firm deadline on any potential rewrite 
of a rule, and where the pending case has already been fully 
briefed and argued and is ready for decision.124 Without a firm 
deadline on a new rule, there is little chance that any new rule 
would turn the existing case into an “abstract disagree-
ment[] .”125 And the agency could drag its feet and use an abey-
ance simply as an attempt to evade review of the original rule. 
Moreover, if all the briefs have been filed, it is likely that the 
court has started working on the case, thus making it unlikely 
that an abeyance will actually save judicial resources. That is 
definitely the case if oral argument has already taken place, be-
cause the court will have expended judicial resources to prepare 
for argument. In fact, an abeyance could waste judicial resources 
because work that the court likely already did on the case could 
go stale and would need to be redone should the court need to 
decide the case in the future.  
Prior to the Trump administration, courts granted abey-
ances in cases where the argument that the court would save 
judicial resources by waiting was relatively strong.126 For exam-
ple, while the Obama administration filed several abeyance re-
quests to facilitate its review of Bush-era rules, those requests 
were made in cases where briefing had not yet been completed 
and, with few exceptions, were unopposed.127 Similarly, during 
 
isting Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Im-
plementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 44,746, 44,753 (proposed Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 
52 & 60) (proposing to conclude that the statute “does not, in fact, delegate dis-
cretion” to the agency to establish the standard); Repeal of Carbon Pollution 
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generat-
ing Unit, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,037-38 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (asserting that the Clean Power Plan “is not within Con-
gress’s grant of authority to the Agency under the governing statute” and “ex-
ceeds the bounds of the statute”). 
 124. Cf. Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explain-
ing that the court reviews an agency’s “finalized” decisions). 
 125. Id. at 386. 
 126. See B.J. Alan Co. v. ICC, 897 F.2d 561, 563, 582 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(explaining that the court had granted an abeyance because the agency had 
granted reconsideration and the court had “not yet taken up the case for prepa-
ration and argument” at that time). 
 127. See, e.g., Order at 1, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, No. 08-1277 (D.C. Cir. 
Apr. 1, 2009) (granting abeyance in proceeding regarding Bush-era emissions 
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the George W. Bush administration, the courts placed cases in 
abeyance when agencies explained that they planned to recon-
sider a portion of the challenged rule, but those requests were 
made before the briefs had been filed.128 As a result, in these 
prior situations, the courts would not have expended any re-
sources in reviewing the merits of the cases. 
2. The Trump Administration’s Record 
During the Trump administration, just like under prior ad-
ministrations, several abeyances were granted in cases that had 
yet to be briefed.129 But in contrast to the practice under prior 
administrations, agencies in the Trump administration asked 
for abeyances in a substantial number of cases that had already 
been fully briefed and, in one case (the Clean Power Plan litiga-
tion), had already been argued.130  
 
standards for petroleum refineries); Order at 1, Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 
1334 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-01200) (granting abeyance in proceeding regard-
ing Bush-era ozone regulation); Order at 1, Am. Petrol. v. EPA, 883 F.3d 918 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1038) (granting abeyance in proceeding regarding 
Bush-era rule deregulating certain materials under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act); Order at 1, California v. EPA, No. 08-1178 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 
25, 2009) (granting abeyance in proceeding regarding California authority to set 
automobile standards during Bush era); Order at 1, Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 09-
1018 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2009) (granting abeyance in proceeding regarding Bush-
era Clean Air Act regulation); Order at 1, New Jersey v. EPA, No. 08-1065 (D.C. 
Cir. Apr. 2, 2008) (granting unopposed motion to hold case in abeyance). 
 128. See, e.g., Order at 1, Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(No. 02-1135) (ordering case be placed in abeyance); Order at 2, New York v. 
EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1387) (ordering case to be placed in 
abeyance “pending completion of respondent’s administrative reconsideration 
process”); Order at 1, Am. Iron & Steel v. EPA, No. 00-01435 (D.C. Cir. Oct 10, 
2000) (per curiam) (ordering case to be held in abeyance “pending the disposi-
tion of the administrative petition for reconsideration”). 
 129. See, e.g., Nat’l Waste & Recycling Ass’n v. EPA, No. 16-1372 (D.C. Cir. 
June 14, 2017) (granting abeyance in a challenge to new source performance 
standards in the oil and natural gas sector); Order at 1, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, 
No. 13-1108 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017) (granting abeyance); Order at 1, Truck 
Trailer Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, No. 16-1430 (D.C. Cir. May 8, 2017) (per curiam) 
(challenge to medium- and heavy-duty truck emissions rule); Order at 4, Am. 
Chemistry Council v. EPA, No. 17-1085 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2017) (granting abey-
ance in challenge to Chemical Disaster Rule); Notice of Voluntary Dismissal 
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) at 1, Cloud Peak Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Interior, No. 16-CV-315-F (D. Wyo. Nov. 3, 2017) (granting voluntary dismis-
sal); Order Granting Motion for Temporary Stay at 1, Cloud Peak Energy, Inc. 
v. U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, No. 16-CV-315-F (D. Wyo. Mar. 24, 2017) (granting 
temporary stay in a case regarding challenge to Valuation Rule). 
 130. Multiple examples of abeyances of this type demonstrate the wide use 
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Unlike the generally unopposed abeyance requests of the 
past, many of the Trump administration’s requests faced stiff op-
position from intervenors supporting the rules and even from 
some petitioners challenging the rules.131 The issues raised in 
the pending cases are likely to be raised again in litigation over 
any revision and thus opponents have stressed that holding off 
on deciding the pending cases will not serve the interests of ju-
dicial economy.132 For example, in the challenge to the Clean 
Power Plan, one of the main issues in the litigation was whether 
the EPA had the authority to set emission standards for power 
plants that take into account the ability of states to induce shifts 
from dirty fuels to cleaner fuels.133 Now, under the Trump ad-
ministration, the EPA has proposed to find that the agency does 
 
of this tool in pending and briefed cases. See Order at 1, Murray Energy v. EPA, 
No. 15-1385 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (granting opposed abeyance in challenge to ozone 
regulations after all briefs had been filed and only days before argument had 
been scheduled); Order at 2, Dalton Trucking, Inc. v. EPA, No. 13-74019 (9th 
Cir. May 10, 2017) (granting opposed motion to postpone oral argument in case 
challenging diesel-engine regulation after all briefs had been filed); Order at 2, 
West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2017) (granting opposed 
abeyance in case challenging the Clean Power Plan after all briefs had been 
filed and en banc oral argument held); Order at 1, ARIPPA v. EPA, No. 15-1180 
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2017) (per curiam) (granting abeyance in challenge to EPA’s 
denial of reconsideration in mercury rule after all briefs were filed and when 
oral argument was less than a month away); Order at 1, Murray Energy Corp. 
v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. April 27, 2017) (granting opposed abeyance in 
case regarding Obama-era mercury rule after all briefs had been filed); Order 
at 2, Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. EPA, No. 15-60821 (5th Cir. Apr. 24, 2017) (granting 
opposed abeyance in case challenging wastewater limits after opening briefs 
had been filed); Order at 2, Walter Coke, Inc. v. EPA, No. 15-1166 (D.C. Cir. 
Apr. 24, 2017) (granting opposed abeyance in case challenging EPA’s start-up 
and shutdown rule after briefs had been filed and shortly before oral argument 
was meant to happen); Order at 1, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. 
Apr. 17, 2017) (granting opposed abeyance in case challenging carbon dioxide 
emissions from new and modified power plants after briefing was complete). 
 131. See supra note 129.  
 132. See Environmental Intervenors’ Opposition to Motion to Postpone Oral 
Argument at 2–3, Walter Coke, Inc. v. EPA, No. 15-1166 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 
2017) (explaining that an abeyance would serve no purpose because the ques-
tion at the center of the case concerning the scope of EPA’s authority was likely 
to recur).  
 133. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,760–61 (Oct. 
23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (responding to comments received 
regarding EPA’s authority to set emission standards by weighing factors outside 
of the source). 
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not have authority to rely on such generation shifting.134 Since 
supporters of the Clean Power Plan disagree with that interpre-
tation, the D.C. Circuit will need to decide this issue eventu-
ally.135 
Nonetheless, many courts have granted the Trump admin-
istration’s abeyance requests, leaving the challenges in limbo, 
despite the fact that the usual justifications for abeyances are 
not present.136 The long-time horizon for the administration’s re-
vision efforts137 means that action on the new rules would be un-
likely to moot out the existing case before a decision could be 
issued. The fact that the issues are likely to remain central in 
any litigation over potential revisions means that the courts 
were unlikely to save any effort by putting off deciding those is-
sues.138  
Some judges have expressed reservations about granting 
the continued abeyance requests. Following the D.C. Circuit’s 
grant of the first short-term abeyance in the Clean Power Plan 
litigation, the court continued to grant similar short-term abey-
ances up through April 2019.139 But a few judges on the court 
expressed reservations during the course of issuing those orders. 
In June 2018, Judge Tatel, joined by Judge Millett, criticized 
 
 134. See supra note 123. 
 135. See COMMENTS OF THE ATT’YS GEN. OF N.Y., ET AL., ON THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREEN-
HOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 14–18 (2018), https://ag.ny.gov.sites/default/files/cpp_ 
replacement_comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NX9-PFZ9] (arguing in response 
to the proposed rule that EPA has no basis for determining that it lacks author-
ity to rely on generation-shifting). 
 136. See, e.g., supra notes 127–31 (exemplifying instances where abeyance 
requests were granted, including during the Trump era). 
 137. See, e.g., Status Report Update (July 2018) at 2, Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. 
EPA, No. 15-60821 (5th Cir. July 6, 2018) (reporting to the court that the agency 
continues to consider its plans to revise the effluents limitations, after almost a 
year and a half had passed since the abeyance began); State Petitioners’ Motion 
to Lift Abeyance at 5–8, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 2019 WL 3977557 (D.C. 
Cir. May 18, 2018) No. 15-1385 (arguing that a lengthy abeyance during recon-
sideration had denied petitioners the ability to have arguments decided). 
 138. State and Municipal Respondent-Intervenors’ Opposition to Motion to 
Hold Proceeding in Abeyance at 14, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. 
Cir. Apr. 5, 2017) (arguing that assessing whether a repeal of the Clean Power 
Plan is arbitrary and capricious will require an assessment of whether the pol-
icy was illegal). 
 139. See Court Docket at 114, 117–18, 120, 129, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 
15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015) (granting continued abeyances on August, 8, 
2017, November 9, 2017, March 1, 2018, June 26, 2018, December 21, 2018, and 
April 5, 2019).  
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EPA for using the abeyance, combined with the Supreme Court’s 
stay, to avoid complying with its duty to regulate greenhouse-
gas emission from power plants.140 Judge Wilkins also wrote sep-
arately to say that, in his opinion, because of the stay, EPA had 
used the abeyance to “hijack[] the Court’s equitable power” for 
the purpose of facilitating the agency’s continued review and re-
consideration of the rule.141 In August 2018, EPA published its 
proposed replacement plan.142 And, in December 2018 and again 
in April 2019, the court again renewed the abeyance, these times 
unanimously and without any concurring opinions.143 In July 
2019, EPA published its repeal and replacement rule.144 The pe-
titioners and EPA then moved to have the case dismissed as 
moot and the court granted the motion.145  
Though the D.C. Circuit granted a significant majority of 
abeyance requests, there have been a few exceptions.146 In one 
case in which the court denied the abeyance request, the court 
did not explain its reasons for rejecting the abeyance, but at oral 
 
 140. Order at 2, West Virginia, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 8, 2017) (Tatel, 
J., concurring) (per curiam) (arguing EPA has an affirmative statutory obliga-
tion to regulate greenhouse gases as a result of a 2009 endangerment finding). 
 141. Order at 3, West Virginia, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2018) (Wil-
kins, J., concurring) (per curiam). 
 142. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing 
Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implement-
ing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746, 
44,797–813 (proposed Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52 & 
60) (proposing replacement plan). 
 143. See Order at 1, West Virginia, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2019) 
(granting further abeyance); Order at 1, West Virginia, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. 
Dec. 21, 2018) (granting additional abeyance). 
 144. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to 
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,575–
84 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (publishing the repeal and 
replacement rule). 
 145. Order at 3, West Virginia, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 17, 2019); Peti-
tioners and Petitioner-Intervenors’ Motion for Dismissal of Petitions for Review 
as Moot, West Virginia, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2019), No. 1797267 (re-
questing dismissal as case was now moot); EPA’s Response in Support of Peti-
tioners’ Motion to Dismiss, West Virginia, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 2019), 
No. 1797703 (supporting dismissal and agreeing case was now moot). 
 146. See Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 426 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018) (declining to exercise discretion to place case in abeyance and leaving 
it open for EPA to address the relevance of certain statutory issues in the case 
on remand); Sierra Club v. EPA, 895 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (denying motion 
to hold case in abeyance). 
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argument, Judge Millett noted that EPA was two decades over-
due on its statutory duty to issue an effective rule.147 In another 
case, the court rejected EPA’s request to hold off on deciding 
whether the agency had statutory authority to issue a particular 
rule pending reconsideration because, in the court’s view, the 
statutory authority question was “intertwined with any exercise 
of agency discretion going forward.”148 And in one case, the court 
took a case out of abeyance149 after petitioners argued that EPA 
had made no progress in its reconsideration of the rule and that 
the continued abeyance “effectively denies” the petitioners’ right 
to challenge the rule.150  
In two other cases where a lower court had already ruled, 
the reviewing courts were also less receptive to the Trump ad-
ministration’s abeyance requests than the D.C. Circuit has been. 
For example, the Supreme Court denied the government’s mo-
tion to put off a decision in an appeal over whether a challenge 
to an Obama-era Clean Water Act regulation should be filed in 
the district or circuit court,151 which ultimately led to a lifting of 
the circuit court’s stay of the regulation.152 In another case, a 
district court vacated the Bureau of Land Management’s frack-
ing regulation and the Bureau announced it would be reconsid-
ering the rule.153 The Tenth Circuit then held that the appeals 
were “prudentially unripe” and, rather than letting the case sit 
in abeyance as the government had requested, vacated the dis-
trict court’s decision.154  
 
 147. Stuart Parker, D.C. Circuit Judges Lean Against Abeyance for Indus-
try’s Brick MACT Suit, INSIDE EPA’S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ALERT, Vol. 34, 
No. 24 (Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing Judge Millet’s opinion). 
 148. See Utility Solid Waste, 901 F.3d at 437 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (declining 
EPA’s request for a remand to reconsider its interpretation of a statute because 
the claim “involve[d] a question—the scope of the EPA’s statutory authority—
that is intertwined with any exercise of agency discretion going forward”).  
 149. Order at 1, In re Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 15-1385, 2019 WL 
3977557 (D.C. Cir. 2019), No. 1739106 (ordering consolidated cases be returned 
to the court’s active docket). 
 150. State Petitioners’ Motion to Lift Abeyance at 7, Murray Energy Corp. 
No. 15-1385, 2019 WL 3977557 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2018), No. 1731770. 
 151. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 137 S. Ct. 1452 (2018). 
 152. See In re U.S. Dep’t of Def., 713 F. App’x 489, 490 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 153. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-041-SWS, 2016 
WL 3509415, at *12 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016) (vacating a Bureau of Land Man-
agement rule regulating fracking), vacated sub nom. Wyoming v. Zinke, 871 
F.3d 1133, 1146 (10th Cir. 2017); Wyoming, 871 F.3d at 1140 (discussing agency 
announcements that it would reconsider and rescind the rule). 
 154. Zinke, 871 F.3d at 1143 (vacating the district court’s decision). 
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Despite the fact that the Trump administration has not been 
able to make continued use of abeyances in some cases, it is clear 
that agencies under Trump made much more aggressive use of 
this tool than administrations had in the past. Before the Trump 
administration, abeyances were used exclusively in cases where 
little or no briefing had occurred, and they were generally unop-
posed.155 In contrast, the pattern is very different in cases in 
which the Trump administration has requested abeyances.156 In 
many of the cases, briefing had already been filed and oral argu-
ment had either been scheduled or had taken place.157 Moreover, 
the abeyance requests in those cases were often opposed, making 
clear that the issues would likely remain disputed.158 Yet in 
many circumstances, courts have remained willing to grant 
abeyances for long periods of time.159  
The Trump administration has derived considerable benefit 
from this practice by keeping courts from ruling in favor of rules 
the agencies seek to repeal. Benefits of this kind are likely to 
accrue after an inter-party transition to future administrations 
of either party because either party could find it useful to use 
alleged problems with the original rule to justify replacing or re-
pealing it. As a result, abeyances are likely to remain an attrac-
tive tool for helping undo a prior administration’s regulatory out-
put. 
C. SUSPENSIONS 
The final tool that the Trump administration has used to an 
unprecedented extent has been suspensions of final regulations: 
regulatory decisions that defer compliance by either postponing 
the compliance dates or putting off a regulation’s effective 
 
 155. See supra notes 126–28 (discussing Bush- and Obama-era abeyance 
practices). 
 156. See supra note 130 (discussing Trump-era abeyances). 
 157. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The En Banc D.C. Circuit Meets the Clean 
Power Plan, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/28/the-en-banc-d-c-circuit-meets-the-clean 
-power-plan/ [https://perma.cc/H5KN-MCR6] (exemplifying a case where an 
oral argument had taken place). 
 158. See supra note 138 (arguing that assessing whether a repeal of the CPP 
is arbitrary and capricious will require a decision about whether the policy was 
illegal). 
 159. See, e.g., supra note 139 (listing repeated grants of abeyances). 
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date,160 prior to substantively changing or repealing the regula-
tion itself.161 Suspensions can be extremely useful to a new ad-
ministration seeking to change or alter rules because once im-
plemented a rule is always harder to change.162  
While prior administrations have used suspensions in lim-
ited circumstances, the Trump administration has used them far 
more aggressively, suspending rules that are already effective 
and suspending rules indefinitely. This Section analyzes these 
trends and concludes by showing how, despite the numerous 
court losses suffered by the Trump administration, agencies may 
nonetheless be able to promote their objectives through the use 
of suspensions.  
1. Prior Uses 
Before the Trump administration, suspensions were used 
aggressively under President Reagan, both with and without no-
tice and comment, to indefinitely delay regulations.163 But the 
courts pushed back, holding that indefinite delays were “tanta-
mount to a revocation” and that the APA’s procedural require-
ments applied to those delays just like they applied to repeals.164 
As a result, both the notice-and-comment requirements165 and 
 
 160. The “effective date” is the date when a rule is officially added to the 
Code of Federal Regulations and, depending on the rule, that date might be the 
date by which entities must be in full compliance with the rule. See NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, DOCUMENT DRAFTING HANDBOOK 
loc. 3-7 to 3-8 (2018), https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/write/handbook 
[https://perma.cc/GT44-HTGV]. Some rules also contain “compliance” dates, 
which are additional dates by which regulated entities must have taken speci-
fied actions. See id. loc. 3-9. 
 161. See supra note 38. 
 162. Freeman, supra note 12, at 559 (explaining that “the longer the rules 
have been in place, the harder they may be to undo”). 
 163. See William M. Jack, Taking Care that Presidential Oversight of the 
Regulatory Process Is Faithfully Executed: A Review of Rule Withdrawals and 
Rule Suspensions Under the Bush Administration’s Card Memorandum, 54 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 1479, 1498–99 (2002) (explaining that Reagan delayed as many as 
119 regulations and that many of those suspensions led to lawsuits). 
 164. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 762 n.23 (3d Cir. 1982); 
accord Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The sus-
pension or delayed implementation of a final rulemaking normally constitutes 
substantive rulemaking.”).  
 165. See Jack, supra note 163, at 1503–04, 1504 nn.132–34 (listing cases that 
held the APA’s procedural requirements applied to delays). 
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the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard apply, requiring an 
agency to provide a reasoned explanation for the change.166 
Some commentators argue that “midnight regulations” is-
sued near the end of a president’s term are more likely to be of 
poor quality because they are rushed.167 Thus, with few excep-
tions,168 between the Reagan administration and the beginning 
of the Trump administration, agencies did not suspend already-
effective rules and instead focused on suspending regulations 
that were not yet effective and thus were more likely to be seen 
as so-called “midnight regulations.”169  
 
 166. See Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 99–105 (D.C. Cir 1984) (finding 
an indefinite suspension to be arbitrary and capricious); accord Air All. Houston 
v. EPA, 906 F.3d 1049, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (finding a delay arbitrary and ca-
pricious under the State Farm standard). 
 167. See Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of 
the “Midnight” Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administra-
tions, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1441, 1448 (2005) (exploring the argument that 
midnight rules are more rushed and are therefore less likely to satisfy high 
standards of administrative rulemaking). See generally Edward H. Stiglitz, Un-
accountable Midnight Rulemaking? A Normatively Informative Assessment, 17 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137 (2014) (discussing a recent study finding that 
last-term Presidents, but not continuing Presidents, issue considerably more 
rules categorized as “controversial” during their midnight period, according to 
a variety of proxy measures).  
 168. See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, 111 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (vacating 
a Clinton-era suspension of a Bush-era rule exempting oil mixtures from haz-
ardous waste regulations because the oil mixture rule was already effective).  
 169. See VICTOR S. REZENDES, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-02-
370R, REGULATORY REVIEW: DELAY OF EFFECTIVE DATES OF FINAL RULES SUB-
JECT TO THE ADMINISTRATION’S JANUARY 20, 2001 MEMORANDUM 5–6 (2002) 
(describing Bush-era suspensions of rules that had not yet reached their effec-
tive dates); Beermann, supra note 41, at 986–89 (describing Bush-era suspen-
sions); Jack, supra note 163, at 1486–87 (describing Bush-era suspensions); see 
also Railroad Workplace Safety; Adjacent-Track On-Track Safety for Roadway 
Workers, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,754 (June 5, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 214) 
(further delaying effective date by one year); Railroad Workplace Safety; Adja-
cent-Track On-Track Safety for Roadway Workers, 77 Fed. Reg. 13,978 (Mar. 8, 
2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 214) (delaying effective date by five 
months); Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger 
Trains and Equipment; End-of-Train Devices, 66 Fed. Reg. 29,501, 29,502 (May 
31, 2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 232) (delaying effective date from May 
31, 2001, to a future date to be specified); Service Difficulty Reports, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 21,626 (Apr. 30, 2001) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 121, 125, 135 & 145) 
(delaying effective date by one year); Aluminum in Large and Small Volume 
Parenterals Used in Total Parenteral Nutrition; Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 7864 (Jan. 26, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) (delaying effective 
date by two years). 
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In addition, agencies generally avoided issuing lengthy sus-
pensions—which could be seen as an attempt to effectively re-
peal the regulation without going through the appropriate pro-
cess170—typically restricting their duration to sixty days.171 
President Obama, for example, instructed agencies to issue 
sixty-day extensions for regulations that were not yet effective, 
but instructed them to immediately provide the public with an 
opportunity to comment on both the extension and the merits of 
the original rule.172 Obama also instructed agencies not to issue 
indefinite suspensions.173 As a result of these precautions, many 
of the delays were not challenged—perhaps because of their 
short duration.174  
In the case of higher-profile suspensions that were chal-
lenged, the courts confirmed that delaying a regulation is a sub-
stantive change and that agencies are required to have statutory 
 
 170. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 763 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(stating that an “indefinite postponement could have operated as a repeal”). 
 171. See, e.g., PETER R. ORSZAG, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MEM. FOR THE 
HEADS AND ACTING HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCY, IMPLE-
MENTATION OF MEMORANDUM CONCERNING REGULATORY REVIEW 1–2 (2009) 
(directing agencies to consider postponing the effective dates of rules for sixty 
days, and to immediately open the notice-and-comment period for thirty days to 
allow comment on those rules). 
 172. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agen-
cies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4435, 4435–36 (Jan. 26, 2009) (instructing agencies to “con-
sider” delaying for sixty days the effective dates of final rules for the purpose of 
“reviewing questions of law and policy raised by those regulations”); O’Connell, 
supra note 41 (describing the suspension process engaged in by President 
Obama’s administration as “careful”). 
 173. ORSZAG, supra note 171, at 2 (“In no event should you extend the effec-
tive date of rules indefinitely.”). 
 174. See O’Connell, supra note 41 (explaining that despite the “legal issues,” 
presidents can evade review by issuing only short extensions or being prepared 
to “unfreeze” the suspension in order to moot out a challenge).  
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authority for the changes.175 Some agencies either lifted the chal-
lenged suspensions176 or allowed the suspensions to expire after 
being sued,177 without waiting for a judicial resolution. 
2. The Trump Administration’s Record 
In contrast to recent administrations, the Trump admin-
istration revived many of the strategies that the Reagan admin-
istration had used: more aggressively using suspensions to delay 
rules that were already effective but still had compliance dates 
in the future178 and using suspensions to delay rules for lengthy 
and sometimes indefinite periods of time. The problem was that 
many of the suspensions blatantly violated the law. Thus, they 
led to fierce resistance. This Section describes the Trump admin-
istration’s suspension efforts and explains how the suspensions 
have fared in court.  
Many agencies under the Trump administration have fol-
lowed the Reagan playbook, including the EPA,179 the Food and 
 
 175. See, e.g., N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 
765–66 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that Obama-era suspension of George W. Bush 
regulation was illegal); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 194–
204 (2d Cir. 2004) (vacating Bush-era suspension of Clinton efficiency rule for 
lack of statutory authority); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Reilly, 976 F.2d 36, 
40–41 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (vacating George H.W. Bush-era suspension of congres-
sionally mandated radioactive pollutant emissions standards); Sierra Club v. 
Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 29–34 (D.D.C. 2012) (vacating Obama-era suspen-
sion of court-ordered emissions standards). 
 176. See, e.g., National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and 
Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring: Delay 
of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,342 (May 22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 9, 141–142) (imposing a nine-month suspension in arsenic regulation); Or-
der at 1, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, No. 01-1291 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 2002) 
(dismissing lawsuit after agency announced intent to keep original rule); Press 
Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Announces Arsenic Standard for Drinking 
Water of 10 Parts Per Billion, 2001 WL 1337226 (Oct. 31, 2001) (lifting suspen-
sion of arsenic regulation). 
 177. Final Rule to Stay the Grandfathering Provision for PM2.5, 74 Fed. Reg. 
48,153 (Sept. 22, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); see Clerk’s Order, 
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 09-1287 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 2010) (dis-
missing case after stay expired). 
 178. See supra note 160 (describing difference between effective and compli-
ance dates). 
 179. See Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for Effluent Limita-
tions Guidelines and Standards, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005 (Apr. 25, 2017) (to be cod-
ified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423) (indefinite suspension of rule after it was effective). 
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Drug Administration,180 the Department of Labor,181 the Depart-
ment of Transportation,182 the Department of Energy,183 the De-
partment of the Interior,184 and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development.185 Many other agencies also suspended 
rules before their effective dates.186 
 
 180. Three-Month Extension of Certain Tobacco Product Compliance Dead-
lines, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,338 (May 15, 2017) (publishing guidance to delay compli-
ance deadlines for three months, after the rule was already effective); Extension 
of Compliance Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,825 (May 4, 2017) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 11,101) (one-year delay of compliance deadline); Revised Effective 
Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 8894 (Feb. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1105) 
(short-term delay of effective date issued two days after date had passed). 
 181. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 82 Fed. Reg. 16,902 (Apr. 7, 2017) 
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) (delaying rule regarding investment advi-
sors for two months after the effective date). 
 182. Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 32,139 (July 12, 2017) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 578) (indefinite delay after effective date passed); Extension of Com-
pliance Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,437 (Mar. 21, 2017) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 
234) (one-year delay of rule after the effective date); Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards, 82 Fed. Reg. 9368 (Feb. 6, 2017) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. 
pts. 571, 578) (thirty-six day delay after the effective date). 
 183. Procedural Rules for DOE Nuclear Activities, 82 Fed. Reg. 8807 (Jan. 
31, 2017) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 820) (two-month delay issued after the 
effective date). 
 184. Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430 (June 
15, 2017) (postponing compliance dates pending judicial review after effective 
date); Postponement of Effectiveness, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,823 (Feb. 27, 2017) (post-
poning effectiveness after rule was effective pending review). 
 185. Open Cmtys. All. v. Carson, 286 F. Supp. 3d 148, 158 (D.D.C. 2017) 
(describing memo that delayed fair housing rule for two years after the effective 
date of the rule).  
 186. Energy Conservation Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 8985 (Feb. 2, 2017) (to be 
codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 429–30); Small Business Investment Companies, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 26, 2017) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 107); Delayed Ef-
fective Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 9501 (Feb. 7, 2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 
201 801 & 1100); National Performance Management Measures, 82 Fed. Reg. 
10,441 (Feb. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. pt. 490); Affirmative Action 
for Individuals with Disabilities in Federal Employment, 82 Fed. Reg. 10,863 
(Feb. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1614); Occupational Exposure to 
Beryllium: Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 8901 (Feb. 1, 2017) (to be codi-
fied at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926); Delay of Effective Date for 30 Final 
Regulations, 82 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 26, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
22, 51, 52, 61, 68, 80, 81, 124, 147, 171, 239, 259, 300, 770); Delay of Effective 
Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,464 (Mar. 21, 2017); Chemical Substances When Manu-
factured or Processed as Nanoscale Materials, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,088 (May 12, 
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 704); Drug Pricing Program Delay of Effec-
tive Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,508 (Mar. 6, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 10); 
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Multiple agencies issuing these suspensions failed to follow 
the requirements established by law and the courts have repeat-
edly ruled against the Trump administration after finding both 
procedural and substantive violations.187 For example, many 
courts found that agencies had no excuse for failing to go through 
notice and comment for the suspensions.188 Presumably in light 
of the clear case law, in several cases, the Trump administration 
withdrew suspensions issued without notice and comment after 
being sued.189 
Some agencies that failed to go through notice and comment 
attempted to rely on § 705 of the APA, which allows an agency 
to “postpone the effective date” of a regulation “pending judicial 
review,” as justification for that shortcut.190 But § 705 may be 
used only to suspend a rule before it is effective, not after it is 
effective but before the compliance deadline.191 And this provi-
sion requires agencies to make some showing that a suspension 
is necessary to enable judicial review over the original rule to 
 
Federal Railroad Administration, 82 Fed. Reg. 10,443 (Feb. 13, 2017) (to be cod-
ified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 270). 
 187. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 
894 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2018) (vacating suspension of increased penalties for viola-
tions of fuel economy standards); Sierra Club v. Pruitt, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1050 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (vacating delay of Formaldehyde Rule); California v. U.S. Bu-
reau of Land Mgmt., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (vacating Interior’s 
delay of a rule restricting leaks of natural gas from mining facilities on public 
lands); Becerra v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 276 F. Supp. 3d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(declaring illegal Interior’s delay of a rule updating royalty payment proce-
dures). 
 188. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 894 F.3d at 114 (rejecting reliance on imminent 
deadlines); Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste v. Pruitt, 293 F. Supp. 
3d 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (vacating delay of Pesticide Rule and rejecting claim 
that agency needed time to further review and reconsider the rule); Nat’l Ven-
ture Capital Ass’n v. Duke, 291 F. Supp. 3d 5, 17–21 (D.D.C. 2017) (vacating 
delay of the International Entrepreneur Rule and rejecting reliance on limited 
agency resources and the stop-work order to justify failure to go through notice 
and comment). 
 189. See BETHANY DAVIS NOLL & ALEC DAWSON, DEREGULATION RUN 
AMOK: TRUMP-ERA REGULATORY SUSPENSIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 3 (2018), 
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Deregulation_Run_Amok_ 
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HM9-B8CS] (collecting examples). 
 190. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Con-
servation, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430, 27,431 (June 15, 2017) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 705 
(2018)). 
 191. 5 U.S.C. § 705; Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, 111 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
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proceed in a “just” manner.192 Courts ruled against agencies for 
violating these principles.193  
Agencies have also lost several suspension cases for failure 
to show that they had the necessary authority under the relevant 
substantive statute. For example, the D.C. Circuit vacated EPA’s 
suspensions of two Clean Air Act regulations because of the 
agency’s failure to provide an adequate explanation for how each 
suspension was consistent with EPA’s authority under that stat-
ute.194 In another example, the Northern District of California 
vacated EPA’s delay of a formaldehyde emissions rule after find-
ing that the applicable statute did not allow the agency to extend 
compliance with the formaldehyde standards past a statutorily 
mandated 180-day deadline.195 Here too, the mere filing of a law-
suit led agencies to drop some of their suspensions, presumably 
because the legal basis for their actions was weak or nonexist-
ent.196  
Agencies have also lost cases for failure to comply with the 
reasoned explanation requirement of the APA.197 For example, 
the D.C. Circuit vacated EPA’s suspension of the Chemical Dis-
aster Rule, designed to improve safety procedures at chemical 
plants, after finding that the agency had not adequately justified 
forgoing the rule’s benefits, among other failings.198 Just like in 
cases where agencies were challenged for failure to comply with 
notice-and-comment requirements and for lack of statutory au-
thority, agencies have also dropped suspensions after being sued 
 
 192. Bauer v. DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74, 107 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 193. See, e.g., id. at 108–10; California v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 277 
F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding against agency); Becerra v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, 276 F. Supp. 3d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (same). 
 194. Air All. Hous. v. EPA, 906 F.3d 1049, 1060–61 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (vacating 
suspension in part because EPA failed to show how the suspension was author-
ized by the Clean Air Act); Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (vacating suspension of EPA’s methane rule for failure to satisfy require-
ments of Clean Air Act). 
 195. Sierra Club v. Pruitt, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (de-
scribing series of delays issued by EPA). 
 196. See DAVIS NOLL & DAWSON, supra note 189, at 8 (collecting examples). 
 197. Air All. Hous., 906 F.3d at 1069 (vacating suspension of Chemical Dis-
aster Rule in part for EPA’s failure to satisfy the arbitrary and capricious stand-
ard); California v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(enjoining second suspension of the Waste Prevention Rule for failure to provide 
a reasoned explanation); U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 277 F. Supp. 3d at 1122–
23 (vacating first suspension of the Waste Prevention Rule for the same reason).  
 198. Air All. Hous., 906 F.3d at 1067–68. 
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for failing to comply with the duty to provide a reasoned expla-
nation for the action.199  
3. Value of Suspensions Despite Potential for Court Losses 
Despite significant losses and an uphill battle in the courts, 
not all suspension efforts have failed. In some cases, agencies 
have not faced a legal challenge and in others they were able to 
evade review. In addition, it may be possible for agencies to be 
more careful about following the law than agencies have been 
under Trump and still issue quick suspensions, which might sur-
vive judicial review. As a result, suspensions are likely to remain 
a powerful tool. This Subsection discusses some possibilities for 
suspensions that would not cause as much court drama and 
gives reasons why agencies may even be successful using the 
strategies that agencies under Trump have used. The Subsection 
then analyzes how suspensions could be useful to deregulatory 
or regulatory administrations.  
a. Strategies for Successful Suspensions 
Agencies under Trump tripped up on basic procedural rules 
such as notice-and-comment requirements and the requirement 
that they have statutory authority to issue the suspensions.200 
But it may be possible to issue suspensions quickly without mak-
ing these mistakes. Agencies seeking to suspend rules could in-
stead simply follow the basic notice-and-comment requirements. 
And there may be circumstances where an agency could provide 
good reasons to change a rule’s deadlines and could justify that 
as a reasonable action that is permissible under the relevant 
statute.  
Moreover, even if there are obvious procedural violations, 
future agencies may still get away with suspensions. There are 
several barriers, driven primarily by resource constraints, that 
stand in the way of lawsuits being brought to challenge suspen-
sions in the first place. Litigation is an expensive and time con-
suming process and potential challengers must prove stand-
ing201 as well as marshal the resources to file a motion seeking 
 
 199. See DAVIS NOLL & DAWSON, supra note 189, at 9. 
 200. See text accompanying notes 187–96 (discussing times agencies tripped 
up on basic procedural rules). 
 201. See, e.g., Air All. Hous., 906 F.3d at 1058–59 (holding that workers suf-
fered tangible harm during the time that the Chemical Disaster Rule was de-
layed); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat. Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 
95, 104 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that states and environmental petitioners had 
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vacatur quickly with what are generally time-limited suspen-
sions.202 Perhaps as a result of some of these roadblocks, several 
of the Trump administration’s suspensions have not been chal-
lenged in court.203  
In addition, even when lawsuits are brought, an agency can 
play a game of “whack-a-mole,” withdrawing a challenged sus-
pension and replacing it with a different rule.204 For example, in 
Clean Water Action v. Pruitt,205 EPA had invoked § 705 to indef-
initely suspend206 a rule limiting toxic metal wastewater dis-
charges from power plants, known as the Effluents Rule, after 
its effective date.207 Eight environmental organizations 
promptly sued the agency arguing that the agency had violated 
the APA by not seeking public comment, among other deficien-
cies, and moved quickly for summary judgment.208 But one day 
after the motion for summary judgment had been fully briefed, 
EPA finalized a second suspension, this time with notice and 
comment, withdrawing the first indefinite suspension.209 EPA 
 
standing to challenge the agency’s suspension of penalties for violation of fuel-
economy standards, because the suspension could lead to increased air emis-
sions); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 763 n.23 (3d Cir. 
1982) (observing that indefinite stays are “tantamount to a revocation”). 
 202. See Emergency Motion for a Stay or in the Alternative, Summary Va-
catur, Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1145) 
(compiling motion papers and almost 125 pages of affidavits from scientists, ex-
perts, and affected individuals in support of motion to vacate three-month sus-
pension). 
 203. See DAVIS NOLL & DAWSON, supra note 189, at 10 (collecting examples). 
 204. See, e.g., Partial Delay of Effective Date, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,639 (Mar. 16, 
2018) (indefinite suspension following previous delays and providing that 
knowledge of off-label uses of tobacco products could make those uses “intended 
uses” of the products); Medicare Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 57,066 (Dec. 1, 2017) (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 510, 512) (rescinding the rule bundling payments 
for cardiac care and joint replacement following early delays issued without no-
tice and comment); see also Clean Water Action v. Pruitt, 315 F. Supp. 3d 72, 86 
(D.D.C. 2018) (ruling a case moot because EPA withdrew and replaced the chal-
lenged rule). 
 205. Clean Water Action, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 77. 
 206. Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005 (Apr. 25, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
423). 
 207. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,838 
(Nov. 3, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423). 
 208. Clean Water Action, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 78. 
 209. Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for the Effluent Limita-
tions Guidelines and Standards, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,494 (Sept. 18, 2017) (to be cod-
ified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423). 
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then argued that the challenge to the first suspension should be 
dismissed as moot and the court agreed.210 Though plaintiffs 
have a pending appeal, thus far the timing of EPA’s actions has 
allowed the agency to avoid any declaration that the first indef-
inite suspension violated the APA.211 The Department of the In-
terior similarly avoided the vacatur of its § 705 suspension of the 
Valuation Rule, aimed at reforming royalty procedures for the 
exploitation of natural resources on federal lands.212 In that case, 
the agency rushed out a repeal of the rule.213 Though the court 
hearing the challenge found that the suspension was illegal,214 
it did not vacate the suspension because the repeal was due to 
be promulgated only a few days later.215 Thus, the suspension 
remained in effect until the repeal went into place. Now though, 
a different court has vacated the repeal.216 
b. What Makes Suspensions Useful  
Though brazen use of suspensions that look obviously illegal 
is likely tainted now given the Trump administration’s failure to 
succeed in this area, suspensions could still be useful to future 
administrations, whether they are seeking to promulgate more 
or roll back regulations. For agencies seeking to roll regulations 
back, suspensions can be helpful because they can tip the scales 
in favor of subsequent repeals. Typically, on repeal, agencies 
must assess both the costs of the repeal (in the form of the for-
gone benefits) and the benefits of the repeal (in the form of cost 
savings). Stated differently, the baseline for analysis should in-
clude the rule being repealed.217 The agency must then assess 
the costs and benefits of departing from that baseline and “in 
choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies 
should select those approaches that maximize net benefits.”218 
 
 210. Clean Water Action, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 86.  
 211. Id. 
 212. Postponement of Effectiveness of the Valuation Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 
11,823 (Feb. 27, 2017). 
 213. Repeal of Valuation Reform, 82 Fed. Reg. 36,934 (Aug. 7, 2017) (to be 
codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 1202, 1206). 
 214. Becerra v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 276 F. Supp. 3d 953, 960–61 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
 215. Id. at 967.  
 216. California v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 
2019). 
 217. Air All. Hous. v. EPA, 906 F.3d 1049, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 218. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557–61 (1994). 
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Courts review an agency’s assessment of those costs and benefits 
in order to ensure that agencies considered “an important aspect 
of the problem.”219 Forgone benefits have been held to be an im-
portant aspect of a repeal, which agencies must address.220  
But suspensions help because they ensure that businesses 
do not spend money coming into compliance with a new regula-
tion that the agency hopes to repeal or weaken.221 When firms 
have already spent the money needed to come into compliance, 
for example by purchasing durable equipment, the proposed re-
peal might not save any money and thus would not have any 
benefits (in the form of cost savings). Weighed against the for-
gone benefits, the repeal could look particularly unjustified. On 
the other hand, if the rule has been suspended, when the agency 
proposes a repeal it can take credit for the compliance cost sav-
ings, which would not be available if the rule had been imple-
mented.  
For example, when EPA proposed to repeal the Chemical 
Disaster Rule,222 the agency had issued a suspension, making it 
unnecessary for firms to comply with the rule.223 In the proposed 
repeal, the agency then credited itself with saving the rule’s com-
pliance costs, making the repeal therefore look more beneficial 
than it would have looked without the suspension.224 As another 
example, the Department of Agriculture twice delayed the Or-
 
 219. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983).  
 220. See, e.g., Air All. Hous., 906 F.3d at 1067–69 (holding that suspension 
was arbitrary and capricious for failing to adequately address the rule’s forgone 
benefits); California v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1122–
23 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that agency’s failure to consider forgone benefits 
was arbitrary and capricious). 
 221. See O’Connell, supra note 41, at 527 (explaining that rules are “harder 
to undo” once they have taken effect). 
 222. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,850 (May 
30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68).  
 223. Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,133 (June 14, 2017) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68). 
 224. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,850 (May 
30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68). 
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ganic Livestock Rule, a rule regarding welfare for organic live-
stock, first without225 and then with226 notice-and-comment. Af-
ter a challenge to these suspensions,227 the agency repealed the 
rule and withdrew the suspensions.228 The suspensions, despite 
their withdrawal, enabled the agency to claim that the repeal 
would save all of the costs of the original rule.229 In contrast, had 
the rule gone into effect, the regulated entities would have begun 
coming into compliance, and any of those sunk costs could not 
have been counted toward the repeal’s cost savings. Indeed, im-
plementation may take even the political impetus for repeal 
away,230 which can be problematic for an administration intent 
on trumpeting its deregulatory achievements.  
By making it possible for firms not to implement a rule, 
agencies can also make the repeal’s forgone benefits seem less 
significant. For example, while EPA acknowledged in its pro-
posal to replace the Clean Power Plan that a weaker rule would 
cut fewer greenhouse gas emissions, at public events, Acting Ad-
ministrator Wheeler was able to downplay the harm of the 
change because the Clean Power Plan had never been imple-
mented.231  
 
 225. Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,677 (May 10, 
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 226. Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices, 82 Fed. Reg. 52,643 (Nov. 14, 
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 227. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Organic Trade Ass’n 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 370 F. Supp. 3d 98 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 17-01875). 
 228. Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,775 (Mar. 13, 
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 229. Id. at 10,781. 
 230. Connor Raso, Trump’s Deregulatory Efforts Keep Losing in Court—and 
the Losses Could Make It Harder for Future Administrations to Deregulate, 
BROOKINGS (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/trumps 
-deregulatory-efforts-keep-losing-in-court-and-the-losses-could-make-it-harder 
-for-future-administrations-to-deregulate [https://perma.cc/PZV4-X9Z7] (ex-
plaining that when regulated parties invest in compliance they may lose their 
“appetite . . . to eliminate the rule”); Amena H. Saiyid, We Already Spent the 
Money, Keep Air Toxics Rule: AEP, Duke to EPA (Corrected), (July 13, 2018), 
TOXICS L. REP. (BNA), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XBG7N7A 
0000000?bna_news_filter=environment-and-energy&jcsearch=BNA% 
2520000001648e8dd62fad769fedd21e0000#jcite (explaining that power compa-
nies generally can recoup through customer fees only costs that are deemed 
“prudent” and that rolling back a rule might interfere with those companies’ 
ability to recoup the costs they spent on complying with a now-defunct rule). 
 231. Lee Logan, Health Risk Dispute Over EPA’s ACE Rule Focuses on Reg-
ulatory Baseline, INSIDEEPA (Sept. 6, 2018), https://insideepa.com/weekly 
-focus/health-risk-dispute-over-epas-ace-rule-focuses-regulatory-baseline 
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Presidents who generally oppose regulations may also ben-
efit from issuing suspensions even if they are all ultimately all 
struck down, because that type of agency action can undermine 
the sense that agencies are subject to the rule of law and that 
they can be trusted to act in the public interest. Moreover, an 
anti-regulatory administration can win political points through 
quick and dirty suspensions, even if they are all struck down 
eventually—as the Trump administration has done.232 
For both pro- and anti-regulatory agencies seeking to roll 
back rules after an inter-party transition, suspensions can also 
be useful because they allow an agency to take advantage of im-
plementation uncertainties when justifying a repeal. For exam-
ple, with the Organic Livestock Rule, the agency’s repeal pro-
posal argued that the repeal was justified because of concerns 
that the rule “could have” unintended consequences in the mar-
ketplace.233 Without the suspension, challengers may have been 
able to rebut those claims with facts showing the actual market 
reactions to implementation. Similarly, in the case of the Valua-
tion Rule, the Department of the Interior claimed that several 
“potential” problems with the original rule required its repeal.234 
Had Interior not delayed the Valuation Rule’s implementation, 
there would have been evidence on whether those “potential” 
problems were indeed occurring.235 Both deregulatory and regu-
latory administrations may want to repeal rules and could thus 
benefit from the uncertainty that a suspension produces.  
 
[https://perma.cc/QFG6-3926]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Putting Trump’s “Afforda-
ble Clean Energy” Plan in Perspective, REG. REV. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www 
.theregreview.org/2018/08/28/pierce-trumps-affordable-clean-energy-plan 
-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/3F3P-H76X]. 
 232. See Bethany Davis Noll, Trump’s Regulatory ‘Whack-a-Mole,’ POLITICO 
(Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/04/10/trump 
-federal-regulations-000890 [https://perma.cc/T9AE-CNX3] (explaining the 
Trump administration’s use of this tactic); Neomi Rao, The Trump Administra-
tion’s Deregulation Efforts Are Saving Billions of Dollars, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-trump-administration-is 
-deregulating-at-breakneck-speed/2018/10/17/09bd0b4c-d194-11e8-83d6 
-291fcead2ab1_story.html [https://perma.cc/2PQF-NCVV] (making use of the 
tactic). 
 233. Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices-Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 
59,988, 59,990 (proposed Dec. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 234. Repeal of Valuation Reform, 82 Fed. Reg. 36,934, 36,939 (Aug. 7, 2017) 
(to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 1202, 1206). 
 235. The repeal was eventually struck down for other reasons. See California 
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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Suspensions may also be useful to a new pro-regulatory ad-
ministration seeking to quickly tighten standards. For example, 
if the prior administration had loosened a formerly tighter regu-
latory standard, a suspension could be useful for reinstating the 
formerly stricter regime.236 Or if the prior administration had 
exempted a category of manufacturers from a rule, suspending 
the exemption could subject those manufacturers to the rule.237 
As these examples show, the aggressive use of suspensions will 
likely remain a useful tool to administrations of both parties, de-
spite the significant court losses suffered by Trump-era agencies. 
Litigation challenging a suspension is difficult to bring and an 
agency can play a game of “whack-a-mole” by keeping suspen-
sions short and replacing them with new suspensions or re-
peals.238 Thus, future presidents may be able to use suspensions 
to help undo a substantial portion of the last several years of a 
predecessor’s regulatory policies, as the Trump administration 
is currently doing. 
II.  THE FUTURE OF ROLLBACKS   
Part I discussed the Trump administration’s aggressive use 
of three rollback tools, which will likely remain effective tools for 
either repealing regulations wholesale, in the case of the Con-
gressional Review Act, or tools for facilitating regulatory roll-
backs, in the case of abeyances in pending litigation and suspen-
sions. In this Part, we discuss why these tools are likely to 
continue to be used in future inter-party transitions.  
First, the Trump administration’s aggressive use of rollback 
tactics is the latest step in a game of norm-breaking and political 
tit-for-tat in which the dominant political parties have been en-
gaged for the past few decades. These pathologies have been es-
calating for several years and they are not likely to subside any-
time soon. Because of the ongoing partisan struggle, it is likely 
that future transitions will want to continue making significant 
efforts to roll back or reverse the prior administration’s regula-
tory policies. Indeed, it is completely possible that future admin-
istrations will resort to even more rollback tools and push norms 
 
 236. See N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 
760 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 237. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Management System, 60 Fed. Reg. 55,202 
(Oct. 30, 1995) (reinstating rule requirements). 
 238. See Beermann, supra note 41, at 992–94 (suggesting that incoming 
Presidents can suspend regulations and simply unfreeze the suspension to 
make legal challenges moot); O’Connell, supra note 41, at 530 (same). 
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even further to unsettle the prior administration’s regulations. 
Political tit-for-tat could easily extend beyond just the tools we 
know about now into new areas.  
Second, regulatory policymaking requires a significant in-
vestment of time and promulgating a single regulation can 
stretch through almost all of a president’s term. And, judicial re-
view and implementation very often stretch beyond the term. As 
a result, the three tools discussed in this Article can be invoked 
to place a president’s regulatory policymaking at risk in the 
event of an inter-party transition. We conclude this Part by dis-
cussing the timing of a few of the Trump’s administration’s own 
signature regulatory efforts. Their timing could well make them 
vulnerable should a Democratic president be inaugurated in 
January 2021.  
A. TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGIES 
The two dominant political parties are currently engaged in 
a game of tit-for-tat, where one party departs from a norm that 
had been widely considered to be institutionally desirable and, 
in response, the other party complains. But later, when given the 
opportunity, that other party uses the same tool itself and may 
even double down in the game, breaking further norms. This on-
going game of tit-for-tat is likely to play out in future regulatory 
rollbacks because it is the optimal strategy for the back-and-
forth between the two political parties. As Robert Axelrod ex-
plained, when two actors are engaged in repeated games, a tit-
for-tat strategy is generally understood to be optimal.239 Under 
this strategy, one actor will be cooperative in one period only if 
the other actor was cooperative in the prior period.240 In contrast, 
non-reciprocation, or “unconditional cooperation,” can hurt not 
just the target party but it can also embolden the attacker and 
further reduce social welfare.241  
 
 239. See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION: REVISED 
EDITION (2009) (presenting the findings of the original tournaments of iterated 
prisoners’ dilemma games). An extensive literature has complicated this find-
ing, while still affirming the wisdom of the tit-for-tat approach. See, e.g., Amnon 
Rapoport, et al., Is Tit-for-Tat the Answer? On the Conclusions Drawn from Ax-
elrod’s Tournaments, PLOS ONE (2015), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ 
article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0134128&type=printable [https://perma.cc/ 
G4GD-ZKDU] (discussing Axelrod’s work). 
 240. AXELROD, supra note 239, at 136. 
 241. Id. (“Unconditional cooperation tends to spoil the other player; it leaves 
a burden on the rest of the community to reform the spoiled player, suggesting 
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The clearest example of this game of tit-for-tat in recent U.S. 
politics is the use of the filibuster. Under the George W. Bush 
administration, the Democratic minority in the Senate used the 
filibuster to block several judicial nominations.242 In response, 
under the Obama administration, when control of the Senate 
had shifted, then-Minority Leader McConnell used the filibuster 
to block Executive Branch and judicial nominees.243 These tac-
tics delayed confirmation for many individuals, including De-
fense Secretary Chuck Hagel, Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau Director Richard Cordray, Federal Housing Finance 
Agency Administrator Mel Watts, and three D.C. Circuit nomi-
nees.244  
At that point, the tit-for-tat escalated. In November 2013, 
Democrats responded to the Republican’s obstreperousness on 
circuit court nominees by invoking the “nuclear option” to do 
away with the filibuster’s requirement of sixty votes to Executive 
Branch appointments and lower-court judges.245 The filibuster 
remained in place for Supreme Court nominees and for legisla-
tion. In response, Minority Leader McConnell complained and 
somewhat ominously warned that Democrats would regret it and 
“may regret it a lot sooner” than they thought.246 This prediction 
turned out to be accurate. After the 2016 election, with the pres-
idency now controlled by a Republican, the Republican Senate 
majority did away with the filibuster for Supreme Court nomi-
nations,247 allowing President Trump to obtain confirmation for 
both Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court 
 
that reciprocity is a better foundation for morality than is unconditional coop-
eration.”). 
 242. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 
524 (2004). 
 243. 159 CONG. REC. S8414 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (statement of Sen. 
Harry Reid). 
 244. See id. at S8414–15. 
 245. See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Fil-
ibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/ 
politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html [https://perma 
.cc/6GWW-E99X]; see also Ryan Teague Beckwith, Donald Trump Won by 
Breaking Norms. Democrats Are Starting to Consider It Too, TIME (Sept. 7, 
2018), http://time.com/5390143/donald-trump-democrats-norms [https://perma 
.cc/6ERC-PMRQ] (citing recent examples of Democratic norm-breaking). 
 246. 159 CONG. REC. S8416 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (statement of Sen. 
Mitch McConnell). 
 247. See Ali Rogin, Senate Approves ‘Nuclear Option,’ Clears Path for Neil 
Gorsuch Supreme Court Nomination Vote, ABC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2017), https:// 
abcn.ws/2GyulTj [https://perma.cc/63EK-9TBW]. 
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without the sixty votes that would have otherwise been re-
quired.248  
The Senate has not yet crossed what is perhaps the biggest 
line in the escalating partisan fights. The legislative filibuster 
remains in place and requires sixty Senate votes to obtain clo-
ture and thus bring legislation to a vote.249 As Senator Schumer, 
the Democratic Minority Leader, explained in 2017, losing the 
filibuster for legislation would turn the Senate into a “majoritar-
ian institution like the House, much more subject to the winds 
of short-term electoral change.”250 And at least for now that 
seems unlikely.251  
Even though the filibuster has not been eliminated for leg-
islation, the tit-for-tat game has entered the legislative sphere. 
In particular, the parties’ use of the “reconciliation” process for 
legislation has allowed some legislation to evade the Senate fili-
buster rule and be enacted on a simple majority vote. Reconcili-
ation was created to allow Congress to adjust the draft budget so 
that it would line up with substantive legislation enacted by 
Congress.252 An additional rule, known as the Byrd Rule, re-
stricts the use of reconciliation to pass provisions that are “ex-
traneous” to the budgetary process.253 Despite that rule’s re-
strictions, over time, both parties have expanded the scope of the 
 
 248. BRETT KAVANAUGH VOTE SUMMARY, U.S. SENATE, (Oct. 6, 2018), 
(showing that fifty senators voted yea and forty-eight voted nay); NEIL GOR-
SUCH VOTE SUMMARY, U.S. SENATE, (Apr. 7, 2017), (showing that fifty-four sen-
ators voted yea and forty-five senators voted nay). 
 249. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, Rule XXII, at 15–
17 (2013) (filibuster rule). 
 250. 163 CONG. REC. S2436 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2017) (statement of Sen. Chuck 
Schumer). 
 251. See infra Conclusion. 
 252. ALLEN SCHICK, RECONCILIATION AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
PROCESS 4–8 (1981), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ 
-reconciliation-and-the-congressional-budget-process_153715450859.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NLN9-R25J]; see also Sarah Kliff, Paul Ryan’s Big Enemy on 
Health Care? Senate Rules., VOX (Mar. 9, 2017, 06:50 PM), https://www.vox 
.com/2017/3/9/14876100/ryan-health-care-enemy-parliamentarian-ahca 
[https://perma.cc/AA3J-US52] (quoting a Senate parliamentarian as saying 
“reconciliation was designed for minor budgetary adjustments, not major policy 
proposals”). 
 253. BILL HENIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30862, THE BUDGET REC-
ONCILIATION PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 1–2 (2016), https://fas 
.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30862.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV2C-6BCA]; see 2 U.S.C. 
§ 644 (2018). 
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reconciliation procedure, using it to pass significant substantive 
legislation without bipartisan support.254  
Partisan use of reconciliation began in the Clinton admin-
istration when Republicans uniformly refused to support Clin-
ton’s proposed fiscal stimulus plan.255 The Democrats responded 
by using reconciliation to pass a budget containing tax increases 
and funding for other policies such as education initiatives, 
which received no Republican support.256 Later in 2001, Presi-
dent George W. Bush used the same process to deliver on his 
campaign promise of tax cuts, despite lack of bipartisan support 
and despite Democratic claims that the use of reconciliation for 
this purpose was improper.257  
Tit-for-tat responses heated during the Obama administra-
tion when Senate Democrats used reconciliation, thereby avoid-
ing a filibuster, to pass the Affordable Care Act.258 The law was 
passed in two steps. First, Congress passed the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act through ordinary procedures.259 
But that bill had amendments that some Democrats in the 
House “loathed,” and so the administration used the promise of 
a second bill removing those provisions to bring those members 
on board to pass the first bill.260 And a few days after the first 
 
 254. See, e.g., HENNIFF, supra note 253, at 15–19 (explaining the Byrd Rule’s 
effect on tax cut legislation and healthcare and education reform). 
 255. See Jeff Davis, The Rule That Broke the Senate, POLITICO (Oct. 15, 
2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/10/15/how-budget 
-reconciliation-broke-congress-215706 [https://perma.cc/59QE-L7MQ] (calling 
this incident “the first time budget reconciliation had been used successfully in 
what turned out to be a partisan manner”). 
 256. William E. Foster, Partisan Politics and Income Tax Rates, 2013 MICH. 
ST. L. REV 703, 719 (2013) (describing bill and passage); see Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (delineating edu-
cation initiatives and tax increases). 
 257. Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws about Law-
making in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409, 411 (2001); see also BARBARA SINCLAIR, 
UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 242–51 (4th ed. 2012) (giving thorough history of the 
use of the reconciliation process to enact Bush era tax cuts).  
 258. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
 259. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119. 
 260. SINCLAIR, supra note 257, at 220; see Michael O’Brien, Reid: Dems Will 
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bill was enacted, the Democrats implemented this promise, us-
ing the reconciliation procedure to pass the Health Care and Ed-
ucation Reconciliation Act, without any Republican support.261 
President Obama then signed both laws on the same day.262  
Republicans complained bitterly that the use of reconcilia-
tion to pass the Affordable Care Act was “underhanded” and 
“anti-democratic.”263 But after the 2016 election, Republicans re-
sponded in kind by using the reconciliation process to pass a 
massive tax bill.264 In doing so, Republicans made it even harder 
for the minority to resist the bill by moving it through Congress 
so fast that Democrats and the public barely had a chance to 
build political opposition, or even to read it.265 
There is no end in sight to the partisan politics that have 
dominated U.S. politics recently.266 Some commentators have 
noted that the incentives to engage in norm-breaking may be dif-
ferent for the Republican party than for the Democratic party.267 
 
 261. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 1029. 
 262. SINCLAIR, supra note 257, at 230. 
 263. Id. at 215 (“Republicans tried hard to paint the use of reconciliation as 
an underhanded, undemocratic trick, but their own use of the procedure in the 
past undercut their claims.”); see also 159 CONG. REC. S8415-16 (daily ed. Nov. 
21, 2013) (statement of Sen. McConnell) (complaining that Democrats had 
“muscled” healthcare legislation through Congress without taking into account 
“the views of the minority”). 
 264. Z. Byron Wolf, The Senate Voted on a Tax Bill Pretty Much Nobody Had 
Read, CNN (Dec. 2, 2017, 5:20 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/01/politics/ 
senate-vote-still-writing-tax-bill/index.html [https://perma.cc/S5Y5-GTDK]. 
 265. See Elizabeth Drew, How Republicans Killed the Legislative Process, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 4, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/146107/ 
republicans-killed-legislative-process [https://perma.cc/7M2B-Y3JZ] (describ-
ing how the GOP “rush[ed] its tax reform bill through the Senate”); see also Tara 
Golshan, Republicans Are Handwriting Their Tax Bill at the Last Minute, VOX 
(Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/1/16726234/ 
handwritten-republican-tax-bill [https://perma.cc/K3ZW-YRUZ] (describing 
that “mere hours ahead of the Senate’s tax vote” Republicans had “yet to release 
an official copy of the tax bill”). 
 266. See Tushnet, supra note 242, at 551–52; see also Tara Golshan, Pelosi 
Says Trump’s National Emergency Sets a New Precedent for Democrats, VOX 
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/14/18225379/pelosi-national 
-emergency-wall-gun-control-democrat [https://perma.cc/SGU6-QMFW] (de-
scribing Democratic tit-for-tat threats in reaction to President Trump’s proposal 
to declare a national emergency to obtain funds for building a wall along the 
southern border). 
 267. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 44, at 961. But see David Bernstein, Con-
stitutional Hardball Yes, Asymmetric Not So Much, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 
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They have argued that Republicans may be more prone to this 
behavior because escalating tit-for-tat carries the risk of “under-
min[ing] the constitutional system,” in a way that might serve 
the goals of a party intent on “incapacitat[ing] the govern-
ment.”268 For those reasons, some commentators have argued 
that Democrats should not “fight like Republicans.”269  
But other commentators have argued that Democrats 
should “‘fight like Republicans’ and play more constitutional 
hardball.”270 And in the current political climate, continued es-
calation seems likely.271 The parties are more polarized than 
they were in the past and may be unable to seek out a middle 
ground with each other.272 They lack the “internal ideological di-
versity” that is necessary to form a moderating force and to de-
velop policies that have at least some degree of inter-party con-
sensus.273 
The academic literature contemplates the possibility of non-
cooperation in perpetuity,274 and some commentators predict 
that this will cause the parties to escalate “with no obvious end-
point.”275 The last instance of norm-eroding governance with 
high political polarization ended with the Civil War, when gov-
 
207, 213 (2018) (arguing that Democrats have just as much of an incentive to 
engage in constitutional hardball as Republicans). 
 268. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 44, at 940, 980.  
 269. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 215 
(2018). 
 270. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 44, at 979 (quoting Dahlia Lithwick & Da-
vid S. Cohen, Opinion, Buck Up Democrats and Fight Like Republicans, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/opinion/buck-up 
-democrats-and-fight-like-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/A92J-TKDN]). 
 271. Bernstein, supra note 267, at 232–33. 
 272. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 44, at 959–60; Brian F. Schaffner, 
Party Polarization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 
527, 539 (George C. Edwards et al. eds., 2011). 
 273. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 44, at 959–60; Barbara Sinclair, Is Con-
gress Now the Broken Branch, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 703, 716–18 (2014). 
 274. See AXELROD, supra note 239, at 138 (noting that once a feud starts, it 
can continue indefinitely); see also Jonathan Levin, Bargaining and Repeated 
Games, STANFORD 1, 6 (2002), http://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ%20203/ 
RepeatedGames.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2UZ-SRF3] (giving an example of infi-
nitely repeated games). See generally Peter T. Leeson, The Laws of Lawlessness, 
38(2) J. LEGAL STUD. 480 (2009) (“Note that even in the mutual violence equi-
librium, both borderers earn a positive payoff.”). 
 275. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 44, at 977, 980. 
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ernmental “dysfunction” was cured only because one of the par-
ties won control of all institutions following untold horror.276  
To de-escalate in a less traumatic manner, actors can en-
courage cooperation by agreeing to change payoff structures so 
as to reward cooperation and “enlarge the shadow of the fu-
ture.”277 Research also suggests that the two parties are funda-
mentally different: the Republican party is a “vehicle of an ideo-
logical movement” while the Democratic party is a “group 
coalition.”278 A “fuller recognition of the distinctive characters” 
of the two parties might help “reduce the growing antipathy ex-
pressed by partisan voters toward the opposition.”279 But for 
now, it seems unlikely that the tit-for-tat going on between the 
Democratic and Republican parties will end unless the parties 
move closer to the center, creating more space for bipartisan-
ship.280 That does not seem to be in the cards anytime soon, 
though history suggests that it could happen at some point in 
the future.281 In the meantime, partisan politics and the contin-
ued escalation of norm-breaking is likely to remain a significant 
driving force in regulatory policy. As a result, game theory pre-
dicts that, as soon as it has the opportunity to do so, a Demo-
cratic administration is likely to respond to the Trump admin-
istration’s aggressive use of Congressional Review Act 
disapprovals, abeyances in pending litigation, and suspensions 
with the same or similar moves.  
 
 276. Jack Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System 
is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1190 (2014); see also Mark A. Graber, 
Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a 
Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 644–47 (2014) (describ-
ing earlier times of constitutional collapse and reinvention).  
 277. See AXELROD, supra note 239, at 125–36; Tushnet, supra note 242, at 
552–53. 
 278. MATT GROSSMANN & DAVID HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS 3 (2016). 
 279. Id. at 331.  
 280. See Richard L. Hasen, Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 
61 DRAKE L. REV. 989, 995 (2013) (concluding before the 2016 election that it is 
“worth waiting to see if the political system self-corrects”).  
 281. See Russell Berman, What’s the Answer to Political Polarization in the 
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B. TIME FRAME FOR THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
As explained in the previous Section, because of the contin-
ued calls for escalation, the next Democratic president, and sub-
sequent presidents of both parties following inter-party transi-
tions, are likely to use the same rollback tools as the Trump 
administration if they can obtain policy advantages. And that is 
likely to be the case because of the protracted timeline for issuing 
significant rules through notice-and-comment rulemaking, a sig-
nificant mechanism under which agencies establish major regu-
latory policies.282  
To issue rules, agencies must engage in a lengthy process. 
The rules are then subject to lengthy judicial review, and the 
period between a rule’s promulgation and its compliance dead-
lines are sometimes lengthy as well. The longer any of these pro-
cesses take, the more likely it is that a regulation will face a risk 
of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act, an abeyance 
in pending litigation, or a suspension. And as a result of all these 
risks, any one-term president is unlikely to be able to protect her 
regulatory policy legacy from the risk of significant rollbacks. In 
this Section, we describe the average timeline for promulgation, 
judicial review, and implementation of regulations and show 
how the timing of each of those steps could expose rules to one 
or more of the rollback tools.  
1. Promulgation  
The timeline for promulgating a rule includes two compo-
nents: (1) preparation of a proposed rule, and (2) the notice-and-
comment period and promulgation of a final rule. Together, 
these phases could take up an entire presidential term, particu-
larly for major, economically significant rules, potentially sub-
jecting them to the risk of Congressional Review Act disapprov-
als, abeyances, and suspensions.  
For significant rules with large economic impacts—the 
types of rules that presidents care the most about—agencies are 
likely to need to invest significant time and resources prior to 
the publication of a proposed rule.283 The statement of basis and 
purpose accompanying a proposed rule is often hundreds of 
 
 282. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empir-
ical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 929–52 
(2008) (describing notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 283. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOV-
ERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 43–44 (2018). 
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pages long and includes highly complex, technical details, such 
as data, studies regarding that data, and explanations about 
how the agency interpreted and used the data.284 Though it is 
difficult to pinpoint exactly when work begins on a proposed rule, 
research by the Government Accountability Office found that the 
development of such proposals by the Department of Transpor-
tation, EPA, and Federal Drug Administration typically took at 
least two years.285 And for some regulations, this period spanned 
four to six years.286 For example, in a study of ninety EPA rules 
issued under the Hazardous Air Pollutant program during the 
Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies, EPA took close to four 
years to issue a proposed rule after initiating review.287  
The timing of the notice-and-comment period and promul-
gation of a final rule is also lengthy, though shorter than the av-
erage time it takes to prepare a proposed rule. Two different 
studies found that the average notice-and-comment rulemaking 
for the last several decades has been about a year and a half from 
the publication of the proposed rule until the publication of the 
final rule; the median time was one year.288 And some agencies 
took significantly longer.289 For example, the averages at agen-
cies with “controversial regulatory histories and mandates,” 
such as EPA and the Federal Drug Administration, were twenty-
eight and forty-two months, respectively.290 Significant rules, de-
fined as those having large economic effects, also took longer, 
averaging 596 days.291  
As a result of the multi-year process for preparation of a pro-
posed rule and the one- to two-year period required for the no-
tice-and-comment period and the promulgation of the final rule, 
 
 284. Richard J. Pierce, Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Test-
ing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1497 (2012).  
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4 (2009). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of 
EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 144 n.150, 144–45 
(2011) (analyzing the length of the entire “life cycle” for ninety EPA rules). 
 288. See O’Connell, supra note 41, at 513; Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb 
Yackee, Delay in Notice and Comment Rulemaking: Evidence of Systemic Regu-
latory Breakdown?, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN 163, 168 (Cary Coglianese ed. 
2012); see also Webb Yackee & Webb Yackee, supra note 23, at 1414. 
 289. Webb Yackee & Webb Yackee, supra note 288, at 164. 
 290. Id. at 164, 171. 
 291. See O’Connell, supra note 41, at 514.  
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it is highly likely that future presidential administrations will 
be finalizing a significant proportion of their major rules suffi-
ciently close to the end of the presidential term to put those rules 
at risk of rollback tactics. This problem will be particularly sali-
ent for one-term presidents but, as we discuss in Part III, it will 
affect two-term presidents as well. 
2. Judicial Review 
Rules that are completed far enough in advance to be safe 
from the Congressional Review Act may still be under judicial 
review when the presidency changes hands, making them vul-
nerable to the two other rollback tools: abeyances and suspen-
sions.  
The speed at which the government is able to get through 
judicial review, both for the original challenge and for any possi-
ble further review, can have a significant impact on rollback ef-
forts. While no comprehensive empirical studies have sought to 
document the typical length of judicial review, the D.C. Circuit’s 
review period can provide a useful gauge because the court has 
jurisdiction, including in some cases exclusive jurisdiction, over 
several categories of administrative challenges. As a result, in 
2010, the court heard 36% of all administrative review cases.292 
The D.C. Circuit’s review period starts with petitioners filing 
their challenges, in accordance with the timing requirements in 
the relevant statute.293 For important categories of regulations 
under the Clean Air Act, petitioners typically have sixty days 
from the publication of the final rule in the Federal Register to 
file challenges in the D.C. Circuit.294 The median time from filing 
a notice of appeal until the disposition of a case on the merits in 
all D.C. Circuit cases is a little bit more than twelve months.295 
 
 292. See Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 COR-
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But challenges to complex administrative cases can take consid-
erably longer.296 This means that it is likely that a rule finalized 
within the last year or so of a presidential term is likely to be 
undergoing judicial review at the end of the presidency. The ad-
ditional delay caused by Supreme Court review, whether at the 
certiorari stage or on the merits, makes more rules vulnerable to 
rollback efforts.  
Several rules illustrate these dynamics. Two mercury regu-
lations finalized in 2005 under President George W. Bush were 
challenged at the D.C. Circuit and struck down in February 
2008.297 The government obtained several extensions in the 
deadline for filing a certiorari petition, pushing the appeal be-
yond the inauguration of President Obama in January 2009.298 
As a result, the Obama administration was able to proceed with 
its planned revision before supporters of the Bush-era rule could 
have a chance to ask the Supreme Court to reverse the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s decision.299  
The Obama administration’s experience with some of its key 
environmental regulations also illustrates this dynamic.300 Con-
sider, for example, the Cross State Air Pollution Rule, which re-
quires states to reduce emissions interfering with the ability of 
downwind states to comply with air quality standards.301 EPA 
began drafting this rule in mid-2008 in response to a court deci-
sion remanding a previous attempt to regulate those emissions. 
Three years later, in August 2011, EPA promulgated the final 
 
months); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS SUM-
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 296. See, e.g., White Stallion Energy Ctr. LLC v. EPA, No. 12-1100, 2014 WL 
140294 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 15, 2014) (showing petition for review filed in February 
2012, and opinion issued in April 2014, challenging EPA’s mercury regulation); 
Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 10-1073, 2012 WL 2381955 (D.C. 
Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (showing petition for review filed in April 2010, and opinion 
issued in June 2012, challenging EPA’s greenhouse gas emissions limits for new 
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 297. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 298. See Richard Lazarus, The Transition and Two Court Cases, 26 ENVTL. 
L.F. 12 (2009). 
 299. Id. 
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 301. 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97 (2011).  
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Cross States Air Pollution Rule.302 In 2012, the D.C. Circuit va-
cated the rule,303 but two years later, the Supreme Court re-
versed and upheld the rule.304 In total, nearly six years elapsed 
between the time the agency began to work on this rule and 
when the Supreme Court upheld its validity. Had this work not 
begun before President Obama took office, the case might have 
been pending before the Supreme Court at the beginning of the 
Trump administration. And had President Obama not won a sec-
ond term, the new administration almost certainly would have 
sought an abeyance in the pending litigation.305  
Perhaps the most ominous illustration of the dangers posed 
by a lengthy rulemaking process combined with time-consuming 
legal challenges, is President Obama’s Clean Power Plan. 
Obama initially directed EPA to begin preparations for a rule 
regulating carbon dioxide emissions in June 2013, early in his 
second term.306 EPA released the proposed rule a year later in 
June 2014307 and published the final rule on October 23, 2015, 
more than halfway through the presidential term.308 That same 
day, twenty-four states and regulated entities sued to have the 
rule stayed.309 The D.C. Circuit initially denied a motion for a 
stay and granted expedited consideration of the case, scheduling 
oral argument before a panel on June 2, 2016,310 but in February 
2016, the Supreme Court granted a stay in a 5-4 decision and 
prevented the rule from going into effect while the case was liti-
gated.311 Presumably in order to expedite matters, the D.C. Cir-
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 309. Associated Press, States, Industry Groups Sue to Block Obama’s “Clean 
Power” Plan, NBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2015, 12:42 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
business/energy/states-industry-groups-sue-block-obamas-clean-power-plan 
-n450216 [https://perma.cc/J7MD-KRBN]. 
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cuit then ordered the case to be heard by the en banc court in-
stead of a panel, putting off argument until September 27, 
2016.312 The court then did not issue a decision during the 
Obama administration.313  
After President Trump took office, EPA successfully con-
vinced the D.C. Circuit to place the case in abeyance while the 
agency reviewed whether it should rescind or revise the Clean 
Power Plan.314 All told, the development of the Clean Power Plan 
and subsequent judicial proceedings stretched on for more than 
six years, from June 2013 to September 2019.315 Had the rule not 
been stayed already, it is possible that EPA would have used the 
pending litigation to justify a suspension.316 Now EPA has re-
pealed the Clean Power Plan,317 and the case was never decided 
as it remained in abeyance until it was dismissed.318  
As these examples help show, even for cases not reaching 
the Supreme Court, judicial review can easily extend one year or 
more past the publication of the final rule. As a result, even if a 
rule is finalized early enough to avoid the Congressional Review 
Act, judicial review could still be ongoing when there is an inter-
party transition, thereby making the rule vulnerable to the new 
administration’s use of the abeyance and suspension tools. 
3. Implementation  
Even if a rule has been finalized and has survived judicial 
review, long implementation periods can also pose a threat to the 
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2019] REGULATION IN TRANSITION 61 
 
rule’s long-term viability. If the rule’s compliance deadlines ex-
tend beyond an inter-party presidential transition, the incoming 
administration could seek to suspend those future compliance 
deadlines.319  
For some rules, the deadlines for compliance are long after 
the rule’s promulgation. At a minimum, under the Congressional 
Review Act, agencies generally must set a regulation’s “effective 
date” thirty days after final publication in the Federal Regis-
ter,320 in order to give regulated entities time to prepare for com-
pliance,321 with sixty days granted if the rule is categorized as 
“major.”322 But agencies often must also set “compliance dead-
lines,” as distinct from effectiveness, when designing the rule. 
While some agencies must set those additional deadlines within 
a prescribed timeframe,323 many agencies have discretion over 
those deadlines.324 Thus, the compliance period is often much 
longer than the required thirty or sixty-day period required be-
fore a rule becomes effective.325 In some cases, compliance can be 
delayed for several years after final publication to give regulated 
entities sufficient time to meet the rule’s requirements.326 
 
 319. See supra Part I.C. 
 320. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2012); see also MAEVE P. CARY, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, 
TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 2–3 
(2016) (explaining that some rules are exempt from the requirements of § 553).  
 321. See U.S. v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 1977) (collecting 
legislative history of provision). 
 322. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3) (2012). 
 323. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Pruitt, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 
2018) (finding that EPA could not delay compliance in formaldehyde emissions 
standards beyond the 180 days stipulated by Congress in the relevant statute). 
 324. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(p)(7)(A) (2012) (providing that “[r]egulations 
promulgated pursuant to this subparagraph shall have an effective date . . . as-
suring compliance as expeditiously as practicable”). 
 325. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., THE FOOD SAFETY LAW AND THE RULEMAKING PROCESS: PUTTING 
FSMA TO WORK 1–2 (2011), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/ 
GuidanceRegulation/UCM277713.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBW6-Y263]; see also 
17 C.F.R. pt. 162 (2012) (setting effective date for thirty days after date of pub-
lication in the Federal Register and compliance date for thirty days plus six 
months after date of publication in the Federal Register).  
 326. See Heinzerling, supra note 12, at 27 n.85 (“Compliance dates set by 
agencies are often later than effective dates, in order to give affected parties 
time to bring their activities into conformity with the rule.”); see also, e.g., 40 
C.F.R. pt. 46 (2017) (setting the compliance date “that is not earlier than three 
years after” final publication); 40 C.F.R. pt. 63 (2013) (setting the compliance 
date for existing sources three years after final publication); 40 C.F.R. pt. 141 
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Although empirical work on the average time between a rule 
finalization and the compliance deadlines has not yet been per-
formed, major environmental rulemakings illustrate that these 
periods can be longer than the rulemaking process itself.327 Mul-
tiple rules issued in the Obama administration had compliance 
deadlines years after the effective date of the final rule. For ex-
ample, the Effluents Rule, an EPA regulation limiting toxic met-
als in wastewater discharges finalized in 2015 had a compliance 
deadline three years after promulgation of the rule.328 An EPA 
regulation concerning chemical accident prevention finalized in 
January 2017, had a compliance deadline four years after finali-
zation of the rule.329 The Clean Power Plan set significant com-
pliance deadlines starting in 2018, three years after it was final-
ized.330 These long deadlines are not a recent phenomenon. 
During the George W. Bush administration, for example, EPA 
set a compliance date for its key environmental regulation, the 
Clean Air Interstate Rule, four years after publication of the fi-
nal rule.331  
Agencies have generally granted these lengthy compliance 
periods to accommodate industry concerns that compliance 
would require large-scale, complex changes to their opera-
tions.332 Indeed, some industry officials have argued that even 
the long deadlines are insufficient.333 In the future, rules with 
those long compliance deadlines are likely to be at risk of sus-
pensions. In sum, given the long promulgation, judicial review, 
and compliance timeframes, a large proportion of significant 
rules may face rollback efforts.  
 
(2009) (setting the compliance date for the sampling plan required by the rule 
at eighteen months after final publication). 
 327. Literature on agency ossification does not examine this question. See, 
e.g., Webb Yackee & Webb Yackee, supra note 288, at 171 (measuring time be-
tween notice of proposed rulemaking and finalization of the rule); Webb Yackee 
& Webb Yackee, supra note 23, at 1446 (same); O’Connell, supra note 41, at 513; 
Wagner, supra note 287, at 145 (noting her research quantified the time until 
finalization of a rule).  
 328. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 423 (2015). 
 329. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2017). 
 330. 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2015). 
 331. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78 and 96 (2005). 
 332. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 423 (2015); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2017). 
 333. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 96 (2005). 
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C. LIKELY FATE OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S 
REGULATIONS 
The timeline of the Trump administration’s own rules, often 
seeking to repeal or amend signature Obama-era regulations,334 
helps illustrate the risks that presidents now face. At the two-
year mark, the Trump administration had proposed, among 
other initiatives, to flatline EPA’s vehicle emissions stand-
ards,335 repeal and replace EPA’s Clean Power Plan,336 repeal 
and replace EPA’s Clean Water Rule,337 and weaken EPA’s me-
thane emissions rule.338  
But as of July 2019, only one of those proposals was final-
ized, the replacement of the Clean Power Plan.339 As a result, 
after the final rules are eventually promulgated, should Presi-
dent Trump not win re-election, the Justice Department might 
not have sufficient time to guide them through litigation while it 
is still under his control.340 A Democratic administration could 
then seek abeyances in the pending litigation to aid efforts to 
undo the rollbacks. And even if the litigation were to be com-
pleted in time, rules with long compliance periods would be vul-
nerable to suspension efforts. 
Moreover, the Trump administration has not taken the pro-
posal steps yet in numerous other promised revisions. Among 
other proceedings, EPA announced that it is reconsidering its 
 
 334. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 566. 
 335. 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 85–86). 
 336. Revisions to Emission Guideline Regulations, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746 (pro-
posed Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60). 
 337. Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 82 Fed. Reg. 34,899 (pro-
posed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 
232, 300, 302, 401). 
 338. Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed and Modified Sources, 83 
Fed. Reg. 52,056 (proposed Oct. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 339. 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2019). 
 340. Coral Davenport, Automakers Plan for Their Worst Nightmare: Regula-
tory Chaos After Trump’s Emissions Rollback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/climate/auto-emissions-cafe-rollback 
-trump.html [https://perma.cc/Q22P-CDUF] (describing fear that a “new admin-
istration could simply decline to defend the plan in court” if the agencies do not 
publish the proposed rollback in time); Dawn Reeves, EPA Scrambles to Com-
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rule limiting methane emissions at landfills.341 EPA has been 
planning to reconsider and revise the Effluents Rule, the rule 
limiting toxic metal wastewater discharges at power plants.342 
And EPA announced it would “review” a pesticide rule.343 Yet at 
the two-year mark, EPA had not published proposals repealing 
those regulations. If the agencies wait too long and if President 
Trump serves only one term, repeals, even if they are finalized, 
could be at risk of Congressional Review Act disapprovals, and 
would almost certainly be at risk of abeyance and suspension ef-
forts.344 
III.  IMPACT ON FUTURE PRESIDENTS   
This Part analyzes the political implications of the transfor-
mation put in motion by the Trump administration’s use of Con-
gressional Review Act disapprovals, abeyances, and suspensions 
to roll back Obama administration regulations. Section A looks 
at the effects of this transformation on the strategies that subse-
quent presidents are likely to follow with respect to the promul-
gation of regulations that are central to their agenda. Section B 
explores the electoral incentives that are likely to be put in mo-
tion by the Trump administration’s practices.  
A. REGULATORY STRATEGIES 
As Parts I and II show, a significant number of regulations 
are likely to be at risk after an inter-party presidential transition 
as a result of the rollback efforts put in play by the Trump ad-
ministration. And though presidents might make more use of 
“unorthodox lawmaking and unorthodox rulemaking,”345 regula-
tory policymaking will nonetheless remain a significant strategy 
that presidents use to establish major regulatory policies.346 As 
a result, future presidents are likely to face different incentives 
with respect to their regulatory strategies than has been the case 
before the Trump presidency.  
 
 341. 82 Fed. Reg. 24,878 (May 31, 2017). 
 342. 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005 (Apr. 25, 2017). 
 343. 82 Fed. Reg. 22,294 (May 15, 2017). 
 344. Outside of the regulatory process, an anti-regulatory president such as 
Trump may be able to accomplish a lot through other means, such as budget 
and staffing cuts, ceasing enforcement of regulations, or appointing heads that 
are hostile to the agency’s mission. But that topic is outside of the scope of this 
Article. 
 345. Gluck et al., supra note 46, at 1865. 
 346. See O’Connell, supra note 282. 
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Previously, outgoing presidents worried that regulations is-
sued in the last few months of the administration—the so-called 
“midnight rules”—would be at risk of rollbacks.347 For example, 
in May 2008, facing an election, George W. Bush instructed 
agencies not to propose any new regulations after June 1, 2008 
or to finalize any new regulations after November 1, 2008.348 
Similarly, Barack Obama instructed agencies to “strive to com-
plete their highest priority rulemakings by the summer of 
2016.”349  
Now a much greater proportion of a president’s regulatory 
output is at risk from the bigger arsenal of rollback tools de-
ployed by the Trump administration and likely to be deployed as 
well by subsequent administrations. This Section explores how 
the actions of the Trump administration may affect future pres-
idential strategies during transition planning, when making de-
cisions about how fast to issue new regulations and how much to 
compromise on them, and when making decisions about whether 
to wait on a new regulatory initiative until after surviving reelec-
tion. The Section also explains how each of these areas presents 
progressively more potential pitfalls.  
 
 347. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 41, at 949–50 (explaining that attention 
has been paid to the actions taken at the very end of an administration); Jason 
M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the “Midnight” 
Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1441, 1447 (2005); Stuart Shapiro, Will Congressional Review 
Act Repeals Change Agency Behavior?, REG. REV. (Apr. 3, 2007), https://www 
.theregreview.org/2017/04/03/shapiro-congressional-review-act-agency 
-behavior/ [https://perma.cc/ZR5Q-MXLS].  
 348. Memorandum from Joshua Bolten, White House Chief of Staff, to 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (May 9, 2008), https://www 
.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa/pdfs/BoltenMemo05092008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X6H3-9SLG].  
 349. Memorandum from Howard Shelanski, Administrator of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, to Deputy Secretaries (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ 
agencyinformation_circulars_memoranda_2015_pdf/regulatory_review_at_ 
the_end_of_the_administration.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3ZK-VS3G] (explaining 
that agencies should finish significant regulations by the summer of 2016 in 
order to “avoid an end-of-year scramble that has the potential to lower the qual-
ity of regulations that OIRA receives for review”). 
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1. Transition Planning 
Presidents have long been concerned with completing im-
portant regulatory initiatives before leaving office.350 And with 
the threat of rollback, a future president will need to work hard 
to avoid repeating the mistakes of prior transitions and use both 
the pre-election and post-election transition times to develop and 
hone her regulatory agenda. In the past, not enough attention 
has been placed on getting started quickly enough to issue rules 
early. Research on recent administrations has found that fewer 
rules are promulgated in a president’s first year in office than in 
later years.351 In the future, as a result of the broader rollback 
strategies that are likely to become commonplace, presidential 
candidates should plan that the period for completing action on 
their regulatory initiatives, without risking rollbacks following 
an inter-party transition, will be shorter. And adjusting to that 
will require presidents to place more attention on the transition 
period before they take office. By focusing on this time, a candi-
date or incoming president can get a jump-start on two tasks 
that are crucial to issuing regulations quickly: developing a reg-
ulatory agenda and having the political appointees in place for 
shepherding the rules through the process.  
Developing a regulatory agenda has been a focus for some 
presidents in the past. For example, President Reagan’s transi-
tion period is generally considered one of the most successful in 
recent decades.352 He instructed his advisers to prepare policy 
recommendations which would enable him to begin work right 
after the inauguration.353 These helped ensure a smoother tran-
sition and quicker implementation of Reagan’s policy choices.354 
But many recent presidents have not placed this much of a focus 
on getting policy goals in place. President Carter, for example, 
began low-profile planning for his transition in the spring of 
1976, but his transition team was not formed officially until after 
the election, and he limited his time in Washington before the 
inauguration.355 President Clinton, like Carter, stayed out of 
 
 350. See Mendelson, supra note 10, at 597 (describing the “end of a presiden-
tial term” as the “natural deadline”); O’Connell, supra note 41, at 503. 
 351. O’Connell, supra note 282, at 896. 
 352. See Stephanie Smith, Presidential Transitions, in PRESIDENTIAL TRAN-
SITIONS: BACKGROUNDS AND ISSUES 19 (Ida Burkhalter ed., 2009). 
 353. Id. 
 354. JOHN P. BURKE, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS: FROM POLITICS TO PRAC-
TICE 178–79 (2000). 
 355. See id. at 17–19, 25; Smith, supra note 352, at 18. 
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Washington, and his transition was marked by delay and prob-
lems, including a dispute about who would run the transition ef-
fort.356 George W. Bush’s transition faced its own unique prob-
lems because of the dispute over the 2000 election results; Bush 
did not immediately receive funding or office space for his tran-
sition planning.357 President Trump also faced problems when 
he changed his transition team after the election, which delayed 
agency-level transition work.358 
Working to develop goals earlier in the process has some 
limitations. For example, developing priorities and writing draft 
rules will be hampered by the lack of access to career staff, a 
crucial part of any effort to complete the technical tasks neces-
sary to shepherd a successful rule through the notice-and-com-
ment process.359 In addition, the substance of important rules 
will need to have approval from the presumptive agency head, 
an individual who is unlikely to be in place until after the elec-
tion. But there are many steps that can be undertaken before the 
election and before the inauguration. The Presidential Transi-
tion Act, originally enacted in 1963 and recently updated to ad-
dress pre- and post-election needs, provides funding for many 
key tasks that need to be accomplished in order to get to the pol-
icy-making job quickly, such as support for developing a human 
resources management system and office space and providing for 
negotiation of a memorandum of understanding between the in-
cumbent president and eligible candidate to facilitate communi-
cations with the agencies.360 The Act also allows likely political 
appointees to receive orientation on matters like the functions, 
duties, responsibilities, and mission of the agencies and to meet 
with agency staff tasked to the transition before and after the 
election, with certain restrictions.361  
 
 356. BURKE, supra note 354, at 284–86; Smith, supra note 352, at 21. 
 357. Smith, supra note 352, at 22–23. 
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Candidates can also prepare a list of policy priorities and 
begin discussing or drafting outlines of rules that would be nec-
essary to accomplish their regulatory goals. Getting started on 
regulatory policymaking before the election is important because 
even without taking into account the tasks of developing a regu-
latory agenda and choosing agency staff, the period between the 
election and when a president-elect takes office is typically too 
short to adequately prepare for the basic requirements necessary 
for launching new substantive initiatives.362 For example, Pres-
ident Clinton spent months prior to his election preparing a new 
approach to regulation that eventually culminated in the issu-
ance of Executive Order 12,866.363 He convened numerous meet-
ings with groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
OMB Watch to discuss how to make the regulatory process more 
efficient.364 Despite this advance work, it was nevertheless six 
months into his administration before he issued his executive or-
der and began to coordinate regulatory planning among various 
agencies.365 
To issue rules quickly, a president will also need to move 
expeditiously on presidential appointees. In the past, presidents 
have focused on announcing cabinet nominees in the month after 
the election.366 But it is an enormous task to fill the rest of the 
political positions at agencies at the start of an administration, 
as there are more than 700 top agency positions that require 
Senate confirmation.367 Delays in rulemakings are associated 
with delays in filling these positions, which can be exacerbated 
by insufficient preparation during the transition period.368 Over 
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the last few decades, presidents have taken longer to find suita-
ble professionals to fill all of the many posts. While the Reagan 
administration filled 86.4% of Senate-confirmed agency posi-
tions during its first year in office, George H.W. Bush managed 
to have 80.1% in place, Clinton 69.8%, George W. Bush 73.8%, 
and Obama 64.4 %, showing a marked decline over the years.369 
The trend has continued in the Trump administration. About 
one year into Trump’s first year, he had nominated only 40% of 
633 key positions.370 By December 31, 2017, Trump had suc-
ceeded in having only 300 appointees confirmed, compared to 
452 for Barack Obama and 493 for George W. Bush at the same 
point in their presidencies.371 Without sufficient personnel in 
place, it may be difficult for agencies to undertake the necessary 
preparations for new rules, including the development of solid 
working relationships between career staff and incoming politi-
cal appointees.372  
Significant improvements in transition planning are likely 
to be crucial for both anti- and pro-deregulatory presidents to 
accomplish their goals. Presidents seeking to issue new regula-
tions and presidents seeking to roll regulations back both need 
to put serious effort into those new rules.373 Without appointees, 
that can be difficult. In fact, recent evidence demonstrates that 
this is crucial even for anti-regulatory presidents, such as 
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ments as one way to accomplish his anti-regulatory goals, assert-
ing that staffing agencies was “totally unnecessary” because the 
agencies already have “hundreds thousands” of employees.375 
But as agencies under Trump have lost case after case in court 
over their deregulatory rules, the administration’s anti-regula-
tory plans seem to have faltered.376 One reason for that has cer-
tainly been poor management of the process.377  
In some ways, transition efforts have become considerably 
more robust over the last two decades, with improvements in ar-
eas such as national security since 9/11.378 But these improve-
ments have not trickled down into agencies, which continue to 
be plagued by staffing shortages into the first months of an ad-
ministration.379 To ameliorate these shortcomings, transition 
teams should at a minimum devote more efforts to agency staff-
ing, particularly identifying personnel for top administrative po-
sitions. While the transition period does not provide a magic bul-
let, by devoting significantly more attention to regulatory 
planning than has been the case to date incoming administra-
tions make it more likely that rules are completed earlier in the 
president’s first term and are therefore more likely to be safe 
from the rollback tactics discussed in this Article, should the 
president fail to be reelected.  
2. Speed, Quality, and Compromise  
The threat posed by the rollback tools is also likely to have 
an impact on agency decisions when planning and drafting reg-
ulations in three significant ways. Each, in turn, could have its 
own potential pitfalls. First, agencies might try to complete rules 
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more quickly than has historically been the case.380 For example, 
an agency could devote more resources to a smaller list of im-
portant rules in order to promulgate them quickly, while work-
ing more slowly on a bigger list. To be sure, some presidents may 
face factors outside of the administration’s control, such as con-
gressional resistance, when attempting to speedily issue new 
and important rules.381 For example, during the Clinton admin-
istration, Congress used appropriations riders to block the De-
partment of Labor from issuing any rule addressing ergonomics 
injuries.382 But focused attention on this issue could help an ad-
ministration finalize at least some significant rules more 
quickly. 
A potential pitfall with this strategy is that issuing regula-
tions quickly could lead to a sacrifice of research and reasoning. 
Some studies suggest that the quality of economic analyses may 
suffer when agencies are placed on tight deadlines.383 Cutting 
corners in that way could lead to judicial reversal.384 As a recent 
example, many rules issued by the Trump administration were 
finalized very quickly and a significant number of those rules 
have been struck down for cutting corners.385 In fact, a stronger 
economic analysis is likely to make the rule more resilient in the 
face of aggressive rollback efforts.386 Thus, while it makes sense 
for agencies to give serious thought to speeding up the various 
components of the rulemaking process, agencies need to be cog-
nizant of the tradeoff between shortcuts that might make rules 
more vulnerable to judicial review and delays that might make 
the rules more vulnerable to rollback efforts. 
Agencies may also work with the White House to speed up 
review by the Office of Management and Budget, a process that 
is meant to ensure that other affected agencies have been con-
sulted and to shore up the technical and economic soundness of 
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the rule.387 But review time is not typically a substantial part of 
the process, so there is not much time to be saved there.388 More-
over, a sacrifice in review time could also lead to shakier rules.  
Second, to avoid the threat of future suspensions, agencies 
might need to shorten compliance deadlines. Industry often asks 
for long compliance deadlines to allow time to install complex 
equipment or technology and to train staff to comply with com-
plicated new procedures.389 And to set shorter deadlines, an 
agency would need to be able to provide a reasoned explanation 
for why the shorter deadlines are realistic.390 Otherwise, the 
agency risks having a court strike down the compliance deadline, 
or maybe even the rule itself. Thus, here too, agencies face a dif-
ficult tradeoff between shorter compliance deadlines, which 
might be attacked in court as infeasible, and longer ones, which 
would increase the risk that the rule would be subjected to roll-
back efforts following an inter-party transition.  
Third, facing a bigger threat of rollbacks might also cause 
agencies to be less likely to be ambitious or take policy risks, es-
pecially with rules they issue later in the presidential term. For 
example, if an agency is issuing a rule near the end of the presi-
dential term, keeping the rule limited and relatively uncontro-
versial or obtaining more buy-in from more stakeholders might 
help protect the rule from disapproval under the Congressional 
Review Act, though this could mean that the president might 
have to compromise on a policy priority. These changes might 
help because, depending on the composition of the Senate, it may 
be necessary to sway only a few Senators from the other party to 
protect a rule from disapproval under the Act and a somewhat 
less ambitious rule might be perceived as less threatening by at 
least a few Senators of the opposite party.391 The example of the 
defeat of the resolution to disapprove the Waste Prevention 
Rule, with three Republican Senators defecting from a party-line 
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vote to join all the Democratic Senators, is instructive in this re-
gard.392 
For rules issued earlier and therefore immune from Con-
gressional Review Act disapprovals, but which would otherwise 
face a risk of suspension or an abeyance in pending litigation, it 
is possible that a regulation that looks for consensus might not 
rise to the top of the list of regulations that the new administra-
tion targets with its rollback tactics. Thus, as a result of the 
transformations wrought by the Trump administration, agencies 
will need to balance the interest in promoting the president’s pol-
icy agenda, which might call for promulgating a more ambitious 
rule, against the higher probability that a less ambitious rule 
would not be subjected to rollback efforts. 
3. Regulatory Timing and Elections 
A president’s reelection, of course, ameliorates the time 
pressure that agencies face as a result of rollback threats. In the-
ory, a smooth transition and an early start to rulemaking, if com-
bined with a second term, could ensure that at least some num-
ber of major rules can be finalized, survive legal challenges, and 
have their compliance deadlines take effect before a possible in-
ter-party transition at the end of a president’s second term.  
But this rosy picture does not reflect the difficult tradeoffs a 
president needs to make between the timing of significant rule-
makings and her reelection campaign. If an agency moves for-
ward with a regulation on a divisive issue during a president’s 
first term, there is the potential for public backlash that could 
damage the president’s reelection prospects.  
These considerations deeply shaped the Obama administra-
tion’s approach to certain environmental regulations, and its re-
cent experiences serve as a warning for future presidents who 
might seek to delay rulemaking out of fear of electoral conse-
quences. President Obama entered his first term seemingly well 
positioned to quickly tackle his policy priorities through rule-
making.393 His transition to office in 2008 is generally viewed as 
one of the most effective in recent administrations, thanks in 
part to President Bush’s extensive preparations, that began a 
year before the election, to turn over the reins of power.394 
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Obama also paid significant attention to planning for the transi-
tion and was able to begin the presidency with White House staff 
“in place, a personnel operation up and running,” and a set of 
legislative and executive priorities ready to announce.395 But de-
spite this running start, President Obama did not address a 
number of regulatory initiatives during his first term, instead 
spending the administration’s initial political capital on legisla-
tive initiatives. Obama met mixed success with this strategy. He 
focused on healthcare reform, which resulted in the passage of 
the Affordable Care Act.396 But his focus on greenhouse gas re-
ductions led to the failed Waxman-Markey bill, which passed the 
House in 2009 but did not clear the filibuster hurdle in the Sen-
ate in 2010.397  
Following that mixed success on legislative initiatives, the 
Obama administration chose to postpone important administra-
tive actions until after the 2012 election to increase the presi-
dent’s probability of reelection.398 The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) appears to have played an important 
role in delaying potentially controversial regulatory initiatives 
prior to Obama’s reelection. Cass Sunstein, who served as direc-
tor of OIRA, has been accused of using his position to stall agency 
actions at the behest of the White House prior to the 2012 elec-
tion.399 For example, before the 2012 election, President Obama 
instructed Sunstein to send back an EPA rule that would have 
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tightened the ozone standard,400 prompting many to suspect that 
the administration had “caved” to election pressures.401 
With the benefit of hindsight, the decision to put off im-
portant regulatory initiatives until the second term has gener-
ated widespread criticism,402 because, had EPA, for example, 
moved more quickly and issued the rules earlier, some of its 
more controversial rules, such as the Clean Power Plan and me-
thane emissions rules, may have been less vulnerable to reversal 
later.403 But, on the other hand, these regulatory initiatives 
would have been dead in their tracks had their unveiling in the 
first term doomed President Obama’s reelection. 
The Obama administration is not alone in delaying rules 
and regulations until after reelection. Stalling potentially con-
troversial regulations is part of a broader pattern political scien-
tists have documented in reelection campaigns, in which presi-
dents avoid divisive issues to maximize their appeal to the 
electorate.404 Although no studies have precisely documented 
this phenomenon for prior presidents, there is evidence that the 
George W. Bush administration postponed rules on food safety, 
land development, telecommunications, and corporate govern-
ance until after the 2004 election.405 President Reagan slowed 
his agency “deregulatory” efforts ahead of his 1984 reelection 
campaign, fearing political backlash.406 Reagan later sped up his 
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regulatory work and issued several controversial midnight reg-
ulations at the end of his term so as to avoid interfering with 
President George H.W. Bush’s incoming message of a “kinder, 
gentler” nation.407 This gamesmanship stretches as far back as 
the Nixon administration, which was accused of delaying worker 
health and safety standards in 1972 as part of a broader effort 
to manipulate agency activities in order to maximize campaign 
contributions ahead of his reelection bid.408  
The difference now is that presidents who engage in this 
practice are putting more of their regulatory initiatives at risk 
of rollbacks. As a result, future presidents will need to consider 
the significant potential tradeoff between promulgating contro-
versial regulations in their first term, which might negatively 
affect their reelection chances, and waiting until the second 
term, which increases the probability that the regulations would 
be rolled back following an inter-party transition. 
Assuming a president is reelected, a second-term president 
has an advantage that a first-term president does not. She can 
spend the first four years in office developing a proposed rule, 
potentially having it ready to publish in the Federal Register 
right after the election and before the second term even begins; 
though care would need to be taken to avoid leaks that could 
have negative electoral consequences. Waiting to go public until 
after the election could avoid the reelection fears that fuel delays 
in regulation while simultaneously completing one of the length-
iest steps in the regulatory process for significant rules with 
more than four years to spare. Under typical circumstances, this 
strategy could protect rules from Congressional Review Act dis-
approvals and abeyances, and if the compliance deadlines are 
short enough, it could also help shield the rules from suspension 
efforts.409 If President Obama had followed this protocol with the 
Clean Power Plan shortly after the November 2012 election in-
stead of in June 2014, the additional year and a half probably 
would have shielded the rule from an abeyance.410 
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B. ELECTORAL INCENTIVES 
The changes in the administrative state that are likely to 
result from the actions of the Trump administration will also af-
fect electoral incentives. This Section discusses congressional 
control and presidential succession, respectively. On the first, it 
argues that outgoing presidents will face a significant additional 
incentive to try to maintain their party’s control of at least one 
chamber of Congress at the end of their terms. On the second, it 
argues that presidents will now need to think not only about how 
a successor might imperil their legacy through future policies 
but also about whether a successor might dismantle a significant 
portion of their own regulatory achievements. 
1. Presidential Succession 
Presidents have understood for a long time that their legacy 
is likely to be better protected by a successor of the same party, 
and commentators have traditionally been concerned with the 
impact of a successor’s policies on that president’s legacy.411 As 
more policy is made through the executive branch through regu-
latory action,412 control of the presidency is increasingly im-
portant. But now, due to the Trump administration’s rollback 
tactics, outgoing presidents will also need to worry more about 
efforts to dismantle their legacy through regulatory rollbacks if 
their successor is of a different party.  
An outgoing president seeking to help elect a successor, how-
ever, is likely to face significant hurdles. One difficulty is that 
there is little historical precedent for the same party to keep con-
trol of the Executive Branch for three terms in a row,413 suggest-
ing that Americans may desire a change in leadership after a 
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two-term president. Since the ratification in 1951 of the Twenty-
Second Amendment, limiting presidents to two terms in office, 
the same party has occupied the White House for three straight 
terms only once, when George H.W. Bush succeeded Ronald 
Reagan.414 This poor track record may be deceptive because some 
of those elections were very close, but it does not bode well for 
future attempts to secure three-term party control of the White 
House.415  
Another problem is that outgoing presidents, as noted 
above, tend to be fairly unpopular.416 This unpopularity has led 
to either the outgoing president declining to campaign or to the 
candidate refusing the assistance.417 For example, Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore distanced himself from President Clinton during 
his campaign, publicly saying he felt “disappointed” about the 
Monica Lewinsky scandal.418  
Even presidents who maintain their popularity have shown 
little interest in helping their party’s candidate.419 One exception 
may be President Reagan, who had historically high approval 
ratings at the end of his second term.420 Yet the successful cam-
paign of then Vice President George H.W. Bush may not have 
benefited significantly from his help.421 After giving a somewhat 
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tepid endorsement, Reagan hit the campaign trail for Bush, trav-
eling at least once a week in the final months before the elec-
tion.422 Although polling evidence indicates that Reagan’s popu-
larity may have helped Bush in a way that Bill Clinton’s lower 
popularity could not help Gore,423 Bush’s win may actually have 
resulted from his subtle attempts to distance himself from Pres-
ident Reagan on matters ranging from foreign policy to the envi-
ronment.424  
Considering the long history of presidents staying out of the 
campaigns of their possible replacements, President Obama’s se-
rious efforts to assist Hillary Clinton’s election bid after she was 
formally nominated were quite notable.425 There were good rea-
sons to think his appearances at rallies and fundraisers would 
be beneficial, as he had worked closely with Clinton during her 
tenure as Secretary of State and had high approval ratings 
among Democrats.426 However, some observers believe that 
President Obama stole the limelight from Clinton at public 
events, with Obama himself admitting that he might be enjoying 
the 2016 campaign “too much.”427 And his ability to connect with 
certain groups, particularly African-American voters, did not 
seem to convince them to turn out for Clinton in the same num-
bers as they did for his elections.428  
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Despite these challenges caused by the administrative law 
transformations on which this Article focuses, outgoing presi-
dents will have an additional reason for benefiting if their suc-
cessor is of the same party. Under that scenario, all three of the 
rollback tools used vigorously by the Trump administration be-
come inoperable. 
2. Congressional Control 
The Trump administration’s aggressive use of the Congres-
sional Review Act underscores the importance of an electoral in-
centive that has gotten little attention: the incentive to retain 
control of at least one chamber of Congress at the end of a pres-
ident’s final term. As explained above, after two terms, presi-
dents are likely to turn the presidency over to the other party.429 
Thus, to avoid the risk of the Congressional Review Act disap-
provals, control of at least one branch of Congress is crucial.  
Presidents have more than one opportunity to address this 
issue. One-third of all Senators face reelection every two 
years,430 and a party’s control of the House during a mid-term 
election can give that party the incumbent advantage at the end 
of a president’s term. As a result, a president can help ensure 
that her party controls at least one chamber of Congress follow-
ing the end of her term not only by making electoral efforts in 
the last congressional election of her presidency, but also by do-
ing so in each prior congressional election.  
But there is little historical precedent for robust presidential 
involvement in congressional elections, particularly at the end of 
the tenure of a term-limited president. This is perhaps in part 
because for much of the twentieth century, control of Congress 
was relatively stable.431 Between 1933 and 1981, the Democratic 
Party had almost exclusive control of both the House and the 
Senate except for two short periods in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.432 Because competition for congressional seats was rela-
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and there was no serious contest for control of Congress.433 The 
stability and consistency of party control of the House and Sen-
ate reduced the incentive on presidents to invest time and energy 
seeking to ensure their party’s success in congressional elec-
tions.434 Some scholars have even gone so far as to refer to cer-
tain Democratic presidents, including John F. Kennedy, as 
“party predators” who used funds and resources for their own 
reelections rather than for strengthening the overall party appa-
ratus.435  
Since the 1980s, contests over congressional seats have be-
come much more competitive, increasing the incentives for pres-
idents to take an active role and interest in securing congres-
sional seats for their party.436 While the turnover rate in the 
1980s was under 10%, by the 2000s the rate was in the teens, 
and in 2010, 2012, and 2018, it was over 20%.437 The 2018 elec-
tion cycle saw the third highest turnover rate since 1974, due to 
a large number of resignations and retirements.438 This change, 
however, has not been reflected in significant shifts in the fund-
raising priorities of recent presidents.439 Both George W. Bush 
and Barack Obama focused considerably more attention on rais-
ing money for their own campaigns rather than on assisting 
their parties’ congressional candidates.440 President Obama in-
herited perhaps the best-organized Democratic Party in recent 
memory, thanks to the efforts of Howard Dean between 2005 and 
2009.441 Yet under his watch, Democrats saw the worst election 
losses at all levels of government than had occurred in any prior 
administration.442 In contrast to a Senate majority that had fifty-
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nine members (fifty-seven Democrats and two independents) in 
April 2009 after Obama was inaugurated and Arlen Specter 
switched to the Democratic party, Obama’s majority had been 
reduced to a forty-six member minority at the end of his second 
term (forty-four Democrats and two independents).443 During 
the same period, the number of house seats fell from 257 to 
188.444 Similar losses occurred in governorships as well as in 
state and local offices.445  
Many members of Congress felt that President Obama did 
little to help them win elections. This narrative first surfaced 
during the 2010 midterm elections, when House Democrats 
claimed he had not given them sufficient public credit for helping 
him accomplish his agenda,446 and continued throughout his 
presidency.447 President Obama did eventually take on a more 
active role in party campaigning for the 2016 elections.448 Unfor-
tunately, he could not overcome several political and cultural 
forces that hurt Democratic candidates, including partisan ger-
rymandering and deepening racial and social divisions.449 
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In seeking to reverse this pattern of historic detachment, 
however, outgoing presidents are likely to contend with the gen-
eral trend of waning public support for lame-duck administra-
tions. Presidents are usually unpopular during the last two 
years of their final term in office, which may in part explain why 
President Obama stayed off the campaign trail in 2014, even 
though he raised considerable money for the party.450 President 
George W. Bush faced a similar problem in the waning years of 
his presidency because of the unpopular Iraq war, which likely 
cost his party control of both chambers of Congress in 2006.451 
President Trump showed considerable interest in campaigning 
to maintain control of Congress, though he has declined to follow 
the advice of Republican party leaders about the best way to do 
so and his efforts have proved toxic to at least some Republican 
candidates.452 
As a result of the increasing importance of having a presi-
dent’s party control at least one of the chambers of Congress at 
the end her term, we might observe a greater commitment by 
future presidents to providing logistical support to their party’s 
electoral structures. For example, President Obama had a mas-
sive database of supporters that was kept a tightly guarded se-
cret after his election, and he has been criticized for housing his 
campaign’s data and analytics separately from those of the Dem-
ocratic Party.453 Future presidents might, instead, opt to cooper-
ate more closely and earlier with their party’s national commit-
tees in order to improve the odds of protecting their regulatory 
legacy through control of Congress. In summary, while presi-
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hillary-clinton-dnc-data-pushback/index.html [https://perma.cc/4GMM-5MR6]. 
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dents have spent significant time fundraising for party candi-
dates over the last two decades, the threat of Congressional Re-
view Act disapprovals is likely to intensify this trend.454  
IV.  RECONCEPTUALIZING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH   
The Trump administration’s actions, and the reaction that 
is likely to follow, will produce an important reconceptualization 
of the nature of the Executive Branch. As discussed throughout 
this Article, one-term presidents are likely to be significantly 
constrained in their ability to have important policy initiatives 
adopted through regulation, which has emerged as the predom-
inant tool for making domestic policy as a result of congressional 
gridlock. To be effective on the domestic front, a president will 
need to be reelected. As a result, we are moving from a world in 
which a single electoral victory was sufficient to effect significant 
policy changes through regulation to one in which consecutive 
victories in national elections will be necessary.  
In analyzing whether this shift is normatively justified, it is 
useful to draw an analogy to requirements in other political sys-
tems where a provision must receive support through multiple 
votes across time before becoming effective (multiple-vote re-
quirements). Such requirements are not uncommon.455 And 
though the Executive Branch of the federal government has 
never been viewed in this light, the justifications for those re-
quirements provide a useful lens through which to examine the 
new reelection requirement.  
This Part describes multiple vote requirements, discusses 
the normative justifications for those requirements, and ana-
lyzes whether those justifications can be applied to the new 
reelection requirement. This Part then provides some final 
thoughts on the perennial question of “What can be done?” and 
on whether the reconceptualization will indeed take place.  
 
 454. Sebastian Payne, Obama Extends Long-Term Trend of Fundraising 




 455. The idea that there should be multiple electoral victories before certain 
legislative acts become final goes as far back as the American colonial period. 
See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 15, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 3086 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
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A. EXAMINING THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION THROUGH THE LENS 
OF MULTIPLE VOTE REQUIREMENTS  
To analyze whether the shift we are witnessing is norma-
tively justified, it is useful to draw an analogy to multiple-vote 
requirements. Multiple-vote requirements for constitutional 
changes exist in many U.S. states as well as in other countries. 
Like with multiple-vote requirements, the new and aggressive 
use of the rollback tools effectively means that an incoming pres-
ident needs two terms to ensure that a substantial proportion of 
her regulatory achievements remain in place. Multiple-vote re-
quirements have been justified primarily on legitimacy, stabil-
ity, and quality grounds. Those justifications provide a vantage 
point for a normative evaluation of the transformation of the Ex-
ecutive Branch set in motion by the Trump administration’s roll-
back actions.  
The analogy is not perfect of course. With the multiple-vote 
requirements for constitutional amendments, because there is 
typically an intervening election between two legislative votes in 
favor of an amendment, the opponents have the opportunity to 
evaluate the amendment and punish the legislators who voted 
for it. In contrast, a president’s reelection is not a referendum on 
any particular regulatory measure. In fact, presidential candi-
dates advocate a large number of domestic and foreign policies 
and the fate of any single regulation is likely to play a small role 
in a voter’s decision. And voters may well be more influenced by 
a candidate’s style and values than by her policy prescriptions.456 
But the reelection of legislators also does not always serve 
as a referendum on the constitutional amendment. Voters elect-
ing a legislator presumably have preferences over many dimen-
sions. As a result, some might prefer a legislator despite their 
 
 456. See, e.g., GEORGE E. MARCUS, W. RUSSELL NEUMAN & MICHAEL MACK-
UEN, AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT (2000) (outlining a 
model of electoral decision-making that incorporates both rational choice and 
emotional reaction); Max Ehrenfreund, A Strange but Accurate Predictor of 
Whether Someone Supports Donald Trump, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/01/how-your 
-parenting-style-predicts-whether-you-support-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/ 
PU7V-Y7H2?type=image] (connecting authoritarian attitudes and personality 
traits to electoral decision-making); Amanda Taub, Why Americans Vote 
‘Against Their Interest’: Partisanship, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/upshot/why-americans-vote-against-their-interest 
-partisanship.html [https://perma.cc/FDZ2-9Q5C] (explaining the impact of par-
tisan identity on electoral decision-making). 
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opposition to the amendment that the legislator favors. And oth-
ers might oppose a legislator despite their support for the 
amendment that the legislator opposes. The analogy between 
the Executive Branch, as it is in the process of being trans-
formed, and the constitutional amendment regimes of some 
states and foreign jurisdictions, is therefore relatively strong.  
It is true that even after the Trump administration’s aggres-
sive use of rollback tools, a president would not need to propose 
a rule in the first term and finalize it in the second term. In fact, 
as discussed above,457 presidents might not want to do that, pre-
ferring instead to work on the proposed rule in the first term but 
publish the proposal only after the reelection. But it is nonethe-
less the case that modern presidents have had a general perspec-
tive on regulations, which the electorate can evaluate. For exam-
ple, since the 1980s, Republicans have embraced an anti-
regulatory party platform and have attributed pro-regulatory 
designs to their Democratic opponents.458 Thus, even if a partic-
ular legislative proposal is not visible to the electorate when a 
president runs for reelection, the president’s general approach to 
regulatory issues is likely to be well understood. 
Thus, we may be moving towards an arrangement where a 
single majority would be sufficient to impose requirements 
through legislation, but successive majorities are necessary 
when the president is using the Executive Branch to make policy 
through regulation. If multiple-vote requirements are designed 
to promote legitimacy, stability, and quality, as the constitu-
tional amendment literature suggests, it is relevant to ask 
whether these goals are also served in the regulatory context. 
This Section looks at these requirements and undertakes that 
analysis. 
1. State and Foreign Provisions 
Currently, fourteen states459 and at least one territory460 re-
quire two sessions of a legislature, and generally an intervening 
 
 457. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 458. See Soren Jordan et al., The President, Polarization and the Party Plat-
forms, 1944–2012, 12 FORUM 169, 180 (2014), http://www.auburn.edu/~scj0014/ 
Downloads/JordanWebbWood.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BGA-VL7E].  
 459. See Dinan, supra note 49, at 11 (listing the number of states that have 
certain requirements to ratify legislatively suggested constitutional amend-
ments). 
 460. See AM. SAM. CONST. art. V, § 3 (showing the necessary requirements 
to ratify legislatively suggested constitutional amendments). 
  
2019] REGULATION IN TRANSITION 87 
 
election, to ratify legislatively suggested constitutional amend-
ments.461 Of these, the most common scheme requires a simple 
majority vote by both chambers of the state legislature, another 
vote by both chambers in a subsequent session, and then a ma-
jority vote by the people in a general election.462 But there are 
variations. For example, Delaware does not require a vote by the 
people, but does require two-thirds votes in both chambers two 
times, with the second vote happening after an intervening gen-
eral election.463 South Carolina inverts the order: first it requires 
two-thirds approval in both chambers, then popular ratification, 
and after that a simple majority vote in both chambers.464 Other 
states offer an option: amending Hawaii’s constitution requires 
a two-thirds vote in both houses in one session, or a simple ma-
jority in both houses in two successive sessions.465 In that consti-
tution, a stable majority can substitute for a perhaps fleeting su-
permajority.  
Provisions of this sort have also existed outside of the United 
States. Constitutional amendment provisions in many European 
countries have requirements for multiple votes,466 generally sep-
arated by intervening elections.467 Some have called for the dis-
 
 461. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (requiring a vote on a previously ap-
proved Constitutional amendment after the next general election); VA. 
CONST. art. XII, § 1 (outlining a similar process). Of the U.S. states with multi-
ple-vote processes for constitutional amendments, three do not require inter-
vening elections. See HAW. CONST. art. XVII, § 3; MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. 
IV, §§ 4–5; N.J. CONST. art. IX, para. 1. 
 462. Dinan, supra note 49, 11–12. 
 463. DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
 464. S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
 465. HAW. CONST art. XVII, § 3. 
 466. See, e.g., CONST. OF LUX. ch. XI, art. 114 (requiring two successive votes 
with an interval of at least three months); 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITU-
TION] 2, art. 110 (Greece); CONST. OF NOR. ch. F, art. 121; REGERINGSFORMEN 
[RF] [CONSTITUTION] 8:14 (Nor.) (requiring succeeding elections between votes 
and stipulating at least nine months between the first submission of the amend-
ment and the next elections); see also European Commission for Democracy 
Through Law (Venice Commission), Study No. 469/2008, Report on Constitu-
tional Amendments, (2010) http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/ 
default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)001-e [https://perma.cc/N4Q6-WP4E] (list-
ing other countries with similar measures). 
 467. See, e.g., GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] [CONSTITUTION] pt. X, § 88 (Den.) (dis-
solving parliament and triggering new elections if an amendment is passed); 
1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 2, art. 110 (Greece) (requiring an inter-
vening election before final approval of an amendment).  
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solution of the legislature after a successful vote, so that the elec-
torate can express its view of the change and newly elected rep-
resentatives who can consider the amendment again.468 Varia-
tions exist beyond Europe too. Azerbaijan and Eritrea require 
successive votes in their national assemblies, without the need 
for intervening general elections.469 Ghana has required two suc-
cessive votes with a supermajority in Parliament for amend-
ments having to do with fundamental rights and freedoms.470 
Nicaragua requires two votes for partial changes to the constitu-
tion, while large, substantive changes need a full constitutional 
convention.471 
2. Justifications 
Multiple-vote requirements are generally justified in terms 
of legitimacy, stability, and quality. This Subsection discusses 
each justification and then addresses whether those justifica-
tions apply to the requirement that a president be reelected be-
fore being able to put in place long-lasting regulatory policy. 
a. Legitimacy 
Multiple-vote requirements help improve the democratic le-
gitimacy of the proposed amendment by ensuring that the 
amendments “approximate the will of the people as a whole” as 
much as possible.472 For example, the Swedish procedure is de-
signed to ensure that there is “time for reflection” and the oppor-
tunity for the people “to express their views” about any potential 
changes, thus ensuring that anything that passes has received 
 
 468. See, e.g., GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] [CONSTITUTION] pt. X, § 88 (Den.) (dis-
solving parliament and triggering new elections if an amendment is passed); 
CONST. OF ICE. § VII, art. 79 (providing that Parliament “shall immediately be 
dissolved” after amendment proposals pass). In Luxembourg, the first legisla-
ture did not vote on the proposal at all: after the legislature “declare[d] the need 
to amend any constitutional provision it specifies,” the parliament “automati-
cally dissolve[d]” without a vote and only the second assembly votes on the pro-
posed amendment. CONST. OF LUX. § 114(1)–(2) (2002).  
 469. See CONST. OF AZER., ch. XII, art. 156, § II; CONST. OF ERIT., ch. VII, 
art. 59.  
 470. See CONST. OF GHANA, art. 290–91 (1979). 
 471. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. 
X, ch. III, art. 192–94, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 18 Feb. 2014 (Nicar.); 
see also Renaldy J. Gutierrez, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Myth or Reality?, 
47 DUQ. L. REV. 803, 807 n.10 (2009) (discussing the Nicaraguan Constitution). 
 472. Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitu-
tional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535, 539–40, 571–72 (1995). 
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“broad support.”473 In this way, multiple votes help guard 
against an “unrepresentative majority” capturing the amend-
ment process.474 And the requirements promote legitimacy by 
preventing “self-dealing that would either benefit incumbent po-
litical actors or disadvantage their adversaries.”475 In addition, 
in the case of the provisions that dissolve the legislature shortly 
after the first vote,476 the provisions can help focus the elec-
torate’s attention on this issue, before other matters take atten-
tion away from the electorate. 
Multiple-vote requirements are also sometimes driven by a 
desire to increase the visibility and vetting of salient and im-
portant decisions. Most significantly, provisions that require the 
legislature to be dissolved after the first constitutional amend-
ment vote are designed to ensure that the attention of the elec-
torate is focused on the amendment.477 
But the trend towards requiring a president to be reelected 
for a significant proportion of her regulatory measures to have 
lasting power does not serve legitimacy concerns. Courts, com-
mentators, and practitioners have long debated the “democratic 
legitimacy of administrative power.”478 Critics have argued that 
agencies lack democratic legitimacy when they engage in 
“agency burrowing” and attempt to entrench their policies so 
that a future president of the opposing party cannot easily 
change them.479 This literature has been premised in part on the 
 
 473. Magnus Isberg, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION OF SWEDEN, THE 
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS AND THE RIKSDAG ACT, at 9 (2016), http://www.riksdagen 
.se/globalassets/07.-dokument--lagar/the-constitution-of-sweden-160628.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A4KA-PEFJ]. 
 474. Richard Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules, 13 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 655, 678–81 (2015); see also Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Sub-
constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1593 (2010). 
 475. Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913, 955 (2014). 
 476. GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] [CONSTITUTION] pt. X, § 88 (Den.); CONST. OF ICE. 
§ VII, art. 79; CONST. OF LUX. § 114(1)–(2) (2002). 
 477. See GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] [CONSTITUTION] pt. X, § 88 (Den.); CONST. OF 
ICE. § VII, art. 79; CONST. OF LUX. § 114(1)–(2) (2002). 
 478. Jud Mathews, Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, 68 ADMIN L. 
REV. 605, 607 (2016). But see Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 41) (arguing that it is “long past time 
to retire this line of reasoning”). 
 479. See Mendelson, supra note 10, at 566–67.  
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view that, compared to legislation, regulatory policymaking ex-
hibits a lack of transparency and accountability.480  
But the way in which regulations are promulgated and leg-
islation is enacted these days does not support the view that reg-
ulatory policymaking exhibits a lack of transparency and ac-
countability.481 Starting in the 1960s and 1970s and accelerating 
through the 1980s until now, courts have imposed significant re-
quirements on agencies, to the point that agencies now conduct 
their work as “quasi-legislatures,” working to build a record and 
to represent the interests of the varied stakeholders affected by 
their decisions.482 To fulfill this vision, courts have required in-
creased participation in the process, through multiple doctrines. 
For example, courts made it easier to meet standing require-
ments so that stakeholders could enforce their right to partici-
pate in the process and implemented the “hard look” doctrine de-
signed to ensure that agencies addressed all the important 
issues raised.483 These procedures have helped create accounta-
bility and have served as a predictable set of constraints on 
agency overreach, waste, and abuse.484 Relatedly, the “hard look” 
doctrine reinforces the view that agency decisions are best made 
by experts who have more experience with a topic than the other 
branches of government, which in turn helps increase their le-
gitimacy as policymakers.485 As an example, during the Obama 
 
 480. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2263–64; Metzger, supra note 13, at 31. 
 481. See Bagley, supra note 478, at 46–47 (arguing that it is not “obvious 
that agencies are less democratic than Congress” and explaining that agencies 
likely have an “edge over an often-dysfunctional Congress”); cf. Metzger, supra 
note 13, at 7 (explaining that the administrative state has several features that 
are “essential for the accountable, constrained, and effective exercise of execu-
tive power”).  
 482. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 507, 510 (1985). 
 483. See id. at 510–11. 
 484. Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative 
Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2056–58 
(2011); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne J. O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 1170 (2008); Mendelson, supra note 10, at 652. But see 
Bagley, supra note 478, at 57 (“Administrative law matters much less to an 
agency’s legitimacy than lawyers like to believe.”); Mendelson, supra note 10, at 
572 (describing ways that agencies often “escape procedural discipline”). 
 485. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2270 (“[The hard look] requirements both 
express a vision of an expert-driven, technocratic administration and attempt 
to force that vision on the agencies.”); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (finding that agency expertise justified 
deference). 
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administration, EPA’s decision to issue the Clean Power Plan in-
volved several years of study as well as EPA’s review of millions 
of public comments, all with the understanding that the rule 
would eventually undergo judicial review and that every step in 
the analysis would be carefully scrutinized.486 
Legislation, in comparison, which is enacted by directly 
elected representatives, may deserve significant respect because 
it reflects the will of the people and allows different parties to 
“come together” transparently and devise “common schemes.”487 
Under the traditional rules of “regular order,” Congress may ap-
proximate this idea because, under those rules, to pass legisla-
tion requires consideration in committee, public hearings coordi-
nated between the two parties, markups, floor consideration, 
and public debates, all of which fosters consensus-building.488 
But nowadays, legislation coming out of Congress has not come 
anywhere near to the “regular order” ideal, deserving of dignity 
as described by Jeremy Waldron.489 Rather, as described 
above,490 to pass legislation, the majority party has had to resort 
to tactics that ignored the minority viewpoint and eschewed any 
attempt at consensus-building.491 Given this change, regulations 
should no longer be necessarily viewed as deserving of less dig-
nity than legislation.  
Another possibility is that regulatory policymaking is less 
salient to the electorate and so there should be a requirement 
that a president is reelected before her regulations can have 
staying power. But these days there is little to support a thesis 
that regulatory policymaking is not sufficiently visible to the 
electorate.  
Regulations are increasingly salient to the electorate and so 
any concerns along this front do not justify the use of aggressive 
rollback tools. Though presidential elections focus on a wide 
range of domestic and foreign policy issues and on many aspects 
 
 486. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,707 (Oct. 23, 
2015) (explaining that the agency published the proposal and supplemental pro-
posal for comment and that it received more than four million comments). 
 487. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 2 (1999). 
 488. See Ron Elving, What Is the ‘Regular Order’ John McCain Longs to Re-
turn to on Health Care?, NPR (July 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/26/ 
539358654/what-is-the-regular-order-john-mccain-longs-to-return-to-on-health 
-care [https://perma.cc/KCU8-9GVV].  
 489. WALDRON, supra note 487, at 2. 
 490. See supra text accompanying notes 267–76. 
 491. See supra Part II.A.  
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of the candidates’ values and style, regulatory policymaking 
plans have played a prominent role in recent elections. President 
Clinton took “ownership of administrative actions” repeatedly.492 
And regulations have played important roles in elections since 
then. For example, whether to promulgate regulations to ad-
dress the financial industry problems that led to the 2008 finan-
cial crisis was a major theme of the 2008 election.493 In the 2012 
election, presidential candidate Mitt Romney made rolling back 
Obama’s “job-killing” regulations a centerpiece of his cam-
paign.494 Regulatory responses to environmental challenges was 
a big theme of the 2012 presidential election season.495 In the 
2016 election season, Donald Trump made ending the so-called 
“war on coal” a big feature of his campaign.496 Indeed, with pres-
idents opting to use the administrative state to make policy, the 
transparency and visibility of their signature regulations has 
been greatly enhanced.497  
Of course, that saliency may be one reason to believe that 
the aggressive rollback tools increase legitimacy. In the case of 
the rules that were issued during the last year or two of a presi-
dency, which are the subject of this Article, it is possible to con-
struct an argument that an electorate that choses a president of 
 
 492. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2300. 
 493. See Transcript of Second McCain, Obama Debate, CNN (Oct. 7, 2008), 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/presidential.debate.transcript/ 
[https://perma.cc/2PD5-ARWT ] (recording Obama’s explanation, in response to 
the first question of the night, that the lack of regulatory oversight helped cause 
the financial crisis). 
 494. Justin Sink, Romney Ad Vows “Obama Era of Big Government” Ends 
on “Day One,” HILL (May 24, 2012), https://thehill.com/video/campaign/229289 
-romney-continues-hammering-day-one-theme-in-new-commercial 
[https://perma.cc/XE7Q-T6Y2]. 
 495. See Elizabeth Shogren, On the Campaign Trail, Regulations Dominate 
the Environmental Debate, NPR, (Oct. 14, 2012), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
itsallpolitics/2012/10/14/162811669/on-the-campaign-trail-regulations 
-dominate-the-environmental-debate [https://perma.cc/DZ6Y-BLXB]; see also 
Justin Sink, New Romney Ads Rip Obama on Coal Energy, HILL (Sept. 19, 
2012), https://thehill.com/video/campaign/250269-romney-ads-rip-obama-on 
-coal [https://perma.cc/ATH6-V6MG]. 
 496. See Coral Davenport, Donald Trump, in Pittsburgh, Pledges to Boost 
Both Coal and Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
09/23/us/politics/donald-trump-fracking.html [https://perma.cc/T5UL-DSPS]. 
 497. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2332 (writing that the “visibility” and “person-
ality” of the Presidency “all render the office peculiarly apt to exercise power in 
ways that the public can identify and evaluate”). 
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the different party may be doing so precisely because that elec-
torate wants to see those rules rolled back. Seen this way, win-
ning reelection would help ensure legitimacy of those regula-
tions. And if the president is not reelected, it may not be that 
concerning if rollbacks are part of the next president’s agenda 
after an inter-party transition. The problem with this theory is 
that the aggressive rollback tools are available to the successor 
president whether or not the incumbent was reelected. Take 
Obama and Trump as an example. Obama had a clear track rec-
ord of calling for climate action, and he was reelected.498 And yet 
Trump was able to use aggressive rollback tools to cut into 
Obama’s climate-related rules. Seen from this perspective, the 
emerging reelection requirement feeds into electorate fickleness 
and may threaten stability in ways which are discussed further 
below.  
In sum, over the last several decades, regulatory policy and 
legislation have moved in different directions. The former has 
acquired more indicia of legitimacy, and the latter has shed 
many of the ones it had.  
b. Stability  
Multiple-vote requirements are also used to promote more 
long-term stability and guard against a “momentary major-
ity.”499 Many multiple-vote requirements in U.S. states were de-
signed to ensure that constitutional changes were not brought 
about by only a temporary majority.500 For example, when Wis-
consin changed its state constitutional amendment process from 
supermajority to multiple votes, one Wisconsin newspaper ex-
plained the reason as to put changes “beyond the reach of any 
sudden ebullition of feeling, prompted by whatever motive.”501  
 
 498. See THE CANDIDATES ON CLIMATE AND ENERGY: A GUIDE TO THE KEY 




 499. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question 
We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Power-
ful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 22 (2010). 
 500. David E. Kyvig, Book Review, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 228, 229 (2000) (re-
viewing MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTI-
TUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1997)).  
 501. Joseph A. Ranney, Wisconsin’s Constitutional Amendment Habit: A Dis-
ease or a Cure?, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 667, 673 (2007). 
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These provisions limit momentary majoritarianism and pro-
mote stability by requiring voters to show approval over ex-
tended periods.502 The resulting delays produced by require-
ments for multiple votes help stem impulsiveness by raising the 
political costs of an amendment.503 “[R]epeated and sustained 
majorities . . . help demonstrate durable rather than transient 
support” for changes.504 And the requirement that politicians 
shepherd an amendment through that process helps lower the 
incentives to act on “temporary spikes in their popularity.”505 In 
sum, multiple-vote procedures may be well-suited to protect 
against moments of intense, but passing, political pressure. 
The requirements for multiple votes can also be thought of 
as applications to the public sphere of cooling-off periods found 
in other areas of the law, which also are thought to benefit in-
creased stability. Those types of periods are present in provisions 
involving consumer protection (e.g., mandatory, non-waivable 
cancellation periods for certain purchases), public safety (e.g., 
waiting periods to buy a gun), and family law (e.g., delays be-
tween issuance of a license and marriage).506 Forcing people to 
wait can give them time to reflect and allow them to make more 
informed decisions507 or decisions that are more likely to serve 
their “true” preferences, thus potentially leading to fewer 
changes over time.508 Such provisions can be particularly helpful 
to individuals who might otherwise make poor decisions due to 
problems of self-control.509  
 
 502. See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 
1429 (2007). 
 503. Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutional-
ism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1989 (2003). 
 504. Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Tiered Constitutional Design, 86 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 438, 503 (2018). 
 505. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 
228 (2013). 
 506. Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1651, 1664 
(2009). 
 507. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Econom-
ics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1240–
43 (2003). 
 508. Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of 
New Paternalism, 2009 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 905, 916. 
 509. Oskari Juurikkala, The Behavioral Paradox: Why Investor Irrationality 
Calls for Lighter and Simpler Financial Regulation, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
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But the goal of stability does not justify the changes in the 
Executive Branch’s ability to meet significant policy goals 
through lasting regulatory policymaking. There is no doubt that 
stability can be a salutary feature of regulatory policymaking. 
Regulated entities often need to make substantial investments 
in order to comply with the regulatory requirements.510 With too 
much regulatory vacillation, companies may put off investment 
decisions until the uncertainty is resolved.511 Similarly, the back 
and forth caused by polarized regulatory decision-making can 
have welfare consequences by creating uncertainty and weaken-
ing trust in regulations.512 
A presidential reelection might be seen as evidence of 
greater stability in the preferences for the regulation. With 
reelection, it may be possible to conclude that the electorate ap-
proves of the regulation and would be pleased to see it stay in 
place. But it is debatable whether the forces unleashed by the 
Trump administration and described in this Article promote reg-
ulatory stability overall. Before the Trump administration’s ag-
gressive rollback strategies, all regulations were more stable, be-
cause, as discussed above, the traditional rollback strategies 
mainly centered around stop-work orders, which applied only to 
regulations promulgated very late in the outgoing president’s 
term, and regulatory repeals and replacements, which were rel-
atively rare.513 Now future presidents are likely to attempt to 
roll back a much bigger set of regulations, regardless of whether 
they were promulgated by a one-term or two-term president. If 
more regulations can be more easily rolled back by a new admin-
istration, a firm may either hold off on investing or face a chance 
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that its compliance investments could become unproductive.514 
In sum, given the destabilizing impact that rollback tools can 
have, a move towards a regime that is defined as a result of the 
aggressive use of these tools cannot be normatively justified on 
stability grounds.  
c. Quality 
The two-vote requirements can also lead to higher-quality 
amendments. In discussing New York’s prior amendment proce-
dure requiring multiple votes, Judge Cardozo noted the need to 
protect “against hasty or ill-considered changes, the fruit of ig-
norance or passion.”515 Similarly, the Swedish procedure ensures 
that constitutional amendments are “hedged about with onerous 
formalities, necessary to deter ill-considered experiments.”516 
And the empirical literature, though limited, suggests that 
the difficulty of passing an amendment under a multiple-vote re-
quirement does not render it impossible to pass the amendments 
but that it instead may indeed help ensure that the resulting 
amendments are of a higher quality. The evidence shows that 
two-vote requirements for simple majorities, absolute majorities, 
and three-fifths majorities have a relatively small effect on 
whether an amendment passes, while a two-vote requirement for 
a high supermajority imposes a higher barrier.517 Garnering a 
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simple majority twice (the most common procedure) is easier, or 
at least statistically more common, than getting a supermajority 
of any kind once.518 And states “with more onerous procedures” 
have been able to improve the quality of amendments and thus 
the possibility of passage.519 Those states have approved amend-
ments at “rates that are as great or greater than those with less 
onerous procedures” and have higher success rates at the refer-
endum stage.520  
An argument could similarly be made that the threat of roll-
backs will lead to higher quality regulations. The desire to issue 
rules that are lasting and can withstand the more aggressive use 
of rollback tools, as described in this Article, may lead to more 
robust and “disciplined” regulatory activity than would other-
wise be the case.521 For example, a president who is reelected 
could take the first term to formulate a rule, which would be pro-
posed only after a successful reelection, leading to a potentially 
stronger policy. On the other hand, with delay comes the poten-
tial for additional costs and more delay, if new information 
comes to light through the delay and must be addressed.  
Moreover, though it is impossible to pinpoint just one cause 
for the sloppiness, the threat of rollbacks and desire to get rules 
out quickly may worsen the quality of agency decisionmaking 
across the board. As an example, many of the rules issued under 
the Trump administration in the early days of the administra-
tion have been so careless that they have been reversed.522 Thus, 
given the risk that rollback tools will cause agencies to act more 
quickly and more sloppily, it is unlikely that the rollback tools 
can be normatively justified on quality grounds. 
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B. WHAT NOW?  
Given that the reconceptualization that is afoot is largely 
unjustified, the question becomes: what can be done? But 
broader policy proposals to reform the world of regulatory roll-
backs are beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article’s 
intent is to shine a light on the shifts occurring in regulatory 
policymaking and to describe the ways that the shift will funda-
mentally change presidential strategies. Here we can answer 
only the question of what happens now. What to do about it, 
must await.  
As this Article has shown, the question of what happens now 
can be answered by reference to those changing presidential 
strategies, discussed above.523 Adopting those strategies should 
allow future presidents to continue to make use of regulatory 
policymaking even as the threat of rollbacks remains. In that 
context, it is important to recognize that as an adjunct to these 
strategies, presidents could be pushed more towards “unortho-
dox lawmaking and unorthodox rulemaking.”524 
Another implication is that this new form of “regulatory 
gridlock” could lead policymakers to turn back to legislation. But 
gridlock still exists in the legislative arena and as long as the 
legislative filibuster remains, legislation will remain a poor op-
tion. Without the legislative filibuster, if the president’s party 
has even a bare majority in Congress, she would not need to use 
regulations to accomplish her policies, because legislation would 
be a realistic option.525 But as long as the majority party in the 
Senate holds that majority by only a small margin, it would be 
hard to imagine the Senate voting to eliminate the filibuster. In-
deed, there are bound to be at least a few outlier Senators who 
will want to keep the filibuster in place either because they are 
not as firmly aligned with the party’s ideology or because they 
believe in the institutional importance of keeping rules that pro-
mote consensus building.526 Even if a party gains control of the 
Senate by a large margin, there may still be enough Senators 
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who would recognize that the majority might be fleeting527 and 
that the elimination of the filibuster might not serve the party’s 
long-term goals.528  
The usefulness of the rollback tools would also change if 
there was a radical alteration in arbitrary and capricious review 
under the APA. With shifts in the courts towards more conserva-
tive judges under President Trump,529 there are two plausible, 
though we believe unlikely, alternatives which push in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, more conservative judges may look 
for ways to loosen the requirements on agencies sufficiently to 
allow Trump-controlled agencies more leeway than they cur-
rently have. As a result, it could get easier to issue regulations 
more quickly in the president’s first term as well as to suspend 
regulations without providing an explanation as required under 
the law as it currently stands.530 But on the other hand, some 
commentators believe that the courts might eliminate various 
deference doctrines for agencies in order to favor legislative pri-
macy, making it harder to engage in regulatory policymaking.531 
But the changes would need to be quite dramatic to affect the 
arguments developed in this Article.532  
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  CONCLUSION   
As this Article has shown, the Trump administration has 
used three relatively unknown tools—disapprovals under the 
Congressional Review Act, abeyances in pending litigation, and 
suspensions—to launch a much broader attack on his predeces-
sor’s regulatory legacy than any previous president.  
Now that the Trump administration has shown the success 
of using these tools, it is likely that future administrations fol-
lowing inter-party transitions will also seriously consider using 
them. And because the background norms of the regulatory state 
are likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future, the 
changes that the Trump administration’s assault on President 
Obama’s regulations will bring to regulatory policymaking are 
significant. This Article explores the characteristics of this 
transformation by looking both at electoral impact and regula-
tory impacts. One conclusion this Article makes is that a future 
president may need to be reelected to have a real hope of making 
significant policy that sticks.  
The resulting impact on the ability of the Executive Branch 
to make policy through regulation is significant and will lead to 
a reconceptualization of the Executive Branch. In this way, low 
visibility actions, not apparent to the vast bulk of the American 
people or even to all experts in regulatory policy, like Congres-
sional Review Act disapprovals, abeyances, and suspensions, 
will lead to important changes in regulatory strategies and to a 
significant reconceptualization of the Executive Branch. Despite 
the lack of normative support, these changes are likely here to 
stay. 
 
